linux-kernel - [PATCH v6 19/39] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary

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Message-ID: <20240621002616.40684-20-iii@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 02:24:53 +0200
From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 19/39] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary

KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.

The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented
and sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.

Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only
check_canary() is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN
checks around canary read accesses.

Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>
---
 mm/kfence/core.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 964b8482275b..83f8e78827c0 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -305,8 +305,14 @@ metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state nex
 	WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define check_canary_attributes noinline __no_kmsan_checks
+#else
+#define check_canary_attributes inline
+#endif
+
 /* Check canary byte at @addr. */
-static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+static check_canary_attributes bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
 {
 	struct kfence_metadata *meta;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -341,7 +347,8 @@ static inline void set_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
 		*((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64;
 }
 
-static inline void check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+static check_canary_attributes void
+check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
 {
 	const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	unsigned long addr = pageaddr;
-- 
2.45.1