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Message-ID: <20240621123903.2411843-5-nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 18:08:43 +0530
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <mingo@...hat.com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<pgonda@...gle.com>, <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<nikunj@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
Add a snp_guest_req structure to simplify the function arguments. This
structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message request API instead
of passing a long list of parameters.
Update the snp_issue_guest_request() prototype to include the new guest
request structure and move all the sev-guest.h header content to sev.h.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 77 ++++++++++-
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 69 ----------
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 15 ++-
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 169 +++++++++++++-----------
4 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index ac5886ce252e..2ac899adcbf6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -112,8 +112,6 @@ struct rmp_state {
struct snp_req_data {
unsigned long req_gpa;
unsigned long resp_gpa;
- unsigned long data_gpa;
- unsigned int data_npages;
};
struct sev_guest_platform_data {
@@ -138,6 +136,75 @@ struct secrets_os_area {
} __packed;
#define VMPCK_KEY_LEN 32
+#define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN 32
+#define AUTHTAG_LEN 16
+#define AAD_LEN 48
+#define MSG_HDR_VER 1
+
+/* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */
+enum msg_type {
+ SNP_MSG_TYPE_INVALID = 0,
+ SNP_MSG_CPUID_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_CPUID_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_KEY_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_REPORT_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_EXPORT_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_EXPORT_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_IMPORT_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_IMPORT_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_ABSORB_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_ABSORB_RSP,
+ SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ,
+ SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP,
+
+ SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX
+};
+
+enum aead_algo {
+ SNP_AEAD_INVALID,
+ SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
+};
+
+struct snp_guest_msg_hdr {
+ u8 authtag[MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN];
+ u64 msg_seqno;
+ u8 rsvd1[8];
+ u8 algo;
+ u8 hdr_version;
+ u16 hdr_sz;
+ u8 msg_type;
+ u8 msg_version;
+ u16 msg_sz;
+ u32 rsvd2;
+ u8 msg_vmpck;
+ u8 rsvd3[35];
+} __packed;
+
+struct snp_guest_msg {
+ struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
+ u8 payload[];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE 4096
+#define SNP_GUEST_MSG_PAYLOAD_SIZE (SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg))
+
+struct snp_guest_req {
+ void *req_buf;
+ size_t req_sz;
+
+ void *resp_buf;
+ size_t resp_sz;
+
+ void *data;
+ size_t data_npages;
+
+ u64 exit_code;
+ unsigned int vmpck_id;
+ u8 msg_version;
+ u8 msg_type;
+};
/* See the SNP spec version 0.9 for secrets page format */
struct snp_secrets_page {
@@ -341,7 +408,8 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
void __noreturn snp_abort(void);
void snp_dmi_setup(void);
-int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
+int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input,
+ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input);
void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status);
@@ -371,7 +439,8 @@ static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { }
static inline bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) { return false; }
static inline void snp_abort(void) { }
static inline void snp_dmi_setup(void) { }
-static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
+static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input,
+ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
{
return -ENOTTY;
}
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 97796f658fd3..000000000000
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
- *
- * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
- *
- * SEV-SNP API spec is available at https://developer.amd.com/sev
- */
-
-#ifndef __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__
-#define __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__
-
-#include <linux/types.h>
-
-#define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN 32
-#define AUTHTAG_LEN 16
-#define AAD_LEN 48
-#define MSG_HDR_VER 1
-
-/* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */
-enum msg_type {
- SNP_MSG_TYPE_INVALID = 0,
- SNP_MSG_CPUID_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_CPUID_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_KEY_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_EXPORT_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_EXPORT_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_IMPORT_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_IMPORT_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_ABSORB_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_ABSORB_RSP,
- SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ,
- SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP,
-
- SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX
-};
-
-enum aead_algo {
- SNP_AEAD_INVALID,
- SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
-};
-
-struct snp_guest_msg_hdr {
- u8 authtag[MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN];
- u64 msg_seqno;
- u8 rsvd1[8];
- u8 algo;
- u8 hdr_version;
- u16 hdr_sz;
- u8 msg_type;
- u8 msg_version;
- u16 msg_sz;
- u32 rsvd2;
- u8 msg_vmpck;
- u8 rsvd3[35];
-} __packed;
-
-struct snp_guest_msg {
- struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
- u8 payload[];
-} __packed;
-
-#define SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE 4096
-#define SNP_GUEST_MSG_PAYLOAD_SIZE (SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg))
-
-#endif /* __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 082d61d85dfc..d3c70604aba8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -2441,7 +2441,8 @@ int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_svsm_attest_req);
-int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
+int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input,
+ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
{
struct ghcb_state state;
struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
@@ -2465,12 +2466,12 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct sn
vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) {
- ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, input->data_gpa);
- ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, input->data_npages);
+ if (req->exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) {
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, __pa(req->data));
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, req->data_npages);
}
- ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, exit_code, input->req_gpa, input->resp_gpa);
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, req->exit_code, input->req_gpa, input->resp_gpa);
if (ret)
goto e_put;
@@ -2485,8 +2486,8 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct sn
case SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN):
/* Number of expected pages are returned in RBX */
- if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) {
- input->data_npages = ghcb_get_rbx(ghcb);
+ if (req->exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) {
+ req->data_npages = ghcb_get_rbx(ghcb);
ret = -ENOSPC;
break;
}
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index e8cef42a211d..85e3d39bd5a9 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@
#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
-#include "sev-guest.h"
-
#define DEVICE_NAME "sev-guest"
#define SNP_REQ_MAX_RETRY_DURATION (60*HZ)
@@ -179,7 +177,7 @@ static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen)
return ctx;
}
-static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz)
+static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req)
{
struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg = snp_dev->secret_response;
struct snp_guest_msg *req_msg = snp_dev->secret_request;
@@ -208,20 +206,19 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload,
* If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return
* an error.
*/
- if (unlikely((resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + ctx->authsize) > sz))
+ if (unlikely((resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + ctx->authsize) > req->resp_sz))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Decrypt the payload */
memcpy(iv, &resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno, min(sizeof(iv), sizeof(resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno)));
- if (!aesgcm_decrypt(ctx, payload, resp_msg->payload, resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz,
+ if (!aesgcm_decrypt(ctx, req->resp_buf, resp_msg->payload, resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz,
&resp_msg_hdr->algo, AAD_LEN, iv, resp_msg_hdr->authtag))
return -EBADMSG;
return 0;
}
-static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type,
- void *payload, size_t sz)
+static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, struct snp_guest_req *req)
{
struct snp_guest_msg *msg = snp_dev->secret_request;
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
@@ -233,11 +230,11 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8
hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM;
hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
hdr->hdr_sz = sizeof(*hdr);
- hdr->msg_type = type;
- hdr->msg_version = version;
+ hdr->msg_type = req->msg_type;
+ hdr->msg_version = req->msg_version;
hdr->msg_seqno = seqno;
- hdr->msg_vmpck = vmpck_id;
- hdr->msg_sz = sz;
+ hdr->msg_vmpck = req->vmpck_id;
+ hdr->msg_sz = req->req_sz;
/* Verify the sequence number is non-zero */
if (!hdr->msg_seqno)
@@ -246,17 +243,17 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8
pr_debug("request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);
- if (WARN_ON((sz + ctx->authsize) > SNP_GUEST_MSG_PAYLOAD_SIZE))
+ if (WARN_ON((req->req_sz + ctx->authsize) > SNP_GUEST_MSG_PAYLOAD_SIZE))
return -EBADMSG;
memcpy(iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, min(sizeof(iv), sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno)));
- aesgcm_encrypt(ctx, msg->payload, payload, sz, &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN,
- iv, hdr->authtag);
+ aesgcm_encrypt(ctx, msg->payload, req->req_buf, req->req_sz, &hdr->algo,
+ AAD_LEN, iv, hdr->authtag);
return 0;
}
-static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
+static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req,
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
{
unsigned long req_start = jiffies;
@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
* sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
* prevent reuse of the IV.
*/
- rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, rio);
+ rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req, &snp_dev->input, rio);
switch (rc) {
case -ENOSPC:
/*
@@ -281,8 +278,8 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
* order to increment the sequence number and thus avoid
* IV reuse.
*/
- override_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
- exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+ override_npages = req->data_npages;
+ req->exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
/*
* Override the error to inform callers the given extended
@@ -337,15 +334,13 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
}
if (override_npages)
- snp_dev->input.data_npages = override_npages;
+ req->data_npages = override_npages;
return rc;
}
-static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio, u8 type,
- void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf,
- u32 resp_sz)
+static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req,
+ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
{
u64 seqno;
int rc;
@@ -359,7 +354,7 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
memset(snp_dev->response, 0, SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE);
/* Encrypt the userspace provided payload in snp_dev->secret_request. */
- rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, rio->msg_version, type, req_buf, req_sz);
+ rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, req);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -367,9 +362,9 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
* Write the fully encrypted request to the shared unencrypted
* request page.
*/
- memcpy(snp_dev->request, &snp_dev->secret_request, SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE);
+ memcpy(snp_dev->request, snp_dev->secret_request, SNP_GUEST_MSG_SIZE);
- rc = __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, exit_code, rio);
+ rc = __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, req, rio);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EIO &&
rio->exitinfo2 == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN))
@@ -378,12 +373,11 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
"Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, exitinfo2: 0x%llx\n",
rc, rio->exitinfo2);
-
snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
return rc;
}
- rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
+ rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, req);
if (rc) {
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n", rc);
snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
@@ -400,8 +394,9 @@ struct snp_req_resp {
static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
- struct snp_report_req *req = &snp_dev->req.report;
- struct snp_report_resp *resp;
+ struct snp_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.report;
+ struct snp_guest_req req = {0};
+ struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
int rc, resp_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
@@ -409,7 +404,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_user(report_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
@@ -417,29 +412,37 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
- resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!resp)
+ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
+ report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!report_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
- rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, req, sizeof(*req), resp->data,
- resp_len);
+ req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+ req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ;
+ req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id;
+ req.req_buf = report_req;
+ req.req_sz = sizeof(*report_req);
+ req.resp_buf = report_resp->data;
+ req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+ req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+ rc = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg);
if (rc)
goto e_free;
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
e_free:
- kfree(resp);
+ kfree(report_resp);
return rc;
}
static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
- struct snp_derived_key_req *req = &snp_dev->req.derived_key;
- struct snp_derived_key_resp resp = {0};
+ struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req = &snp_dev->req.derived_key;
+ struct snp_derived_key_resp derived_key_resp = {0};
+ struct snp_guest_req req = {0};
int rc, resp_len;
/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
u8 buf[64 + 16];
@@ -454,25 +457,35 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp.data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
+ resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp.data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (copy_from_user(req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_user(derived_key_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data,
+ sizeof(*derived_key_req)))
return -EFAULT;
- rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, req, sizeof(*req), buf, resp_len);
+ req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+ req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ;
+ req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id;
+ req.req_buf = derived_key_req;
+ req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req);
+ req.resp_buf = buf;
+ req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+ req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+
+ rc = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg);
if (rc)
return rc;
- memcpy(resp.data, buf, sizeof(resp.data));
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
+ memcpy(derived_key_resp.data, buf, sizeof(derived_key_resp.data));
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &derived_key_resp,
+ sizeof(derived_key_resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
- memzero_explicit(&resp, sizeof(resp));
+ memzero_explicit(&derived_key_resp, sizeof(derived_key_resp));
return rc;
}
@@ -480,32 +493,33 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
struct snp_req_resp *io)
{
- struct snp_ext_report_req *req = &snp_dev->req.ext_report;
- struct snp_report_resp *resp;
- int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
+ struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.ext_report;
+ struct snp_guest_req req = {0};
+ struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
sockptr_t certs_address;
+ int ret, resp_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_sockptr(req, io->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_sockptr(report_req, io->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
return -EFAULT;
/* caller does not want certificate data */
- if (!req->certs_len || !req->certs_address)
+ if (!report_req->certs_len || !report_req->certs_address)
goto cmd;
- if (req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
+ if (report_req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(report_req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (sockptr_is_kernel(io->resp_data)) {
- certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)req->certs_address);
+ certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)report_req->certs_address);
} else {
- certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)req->certs_address);
- if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, req->certs_len))
+ certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)report_req->certs_address);
+ if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, report_req->certs_len))
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -515,45 +529,53 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
* the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy
* zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided.
*/
- memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, req->certs_len);
- npages = req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, report_req->certs_len);
+ req.data_npages = report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
cmd:
/*
* The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
- resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!resp)
+ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize;
+ report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!report_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
- snp_dev->input.data_npages = npages;
- ret = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req->data,
- sizeof(req->data), resp->data, resp_len);
+ req.msg_version = arg->msg_version;
+ req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ;
+ req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id;
+ req.req_buf = &report_req->data;
+ req.req_sz = sizeof(report_req->data);
+ req.resp_buf = report_resp->data;
+ req.resp_sz = resp_len;
+ req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+ req.data = snp_dev->certs_data;
+
+ ret = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg);
/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */
if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) {
- req->certs_len = snp_dev->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ report_req->certs_len = req.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, req, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
if (ret)
goto e_free;
- if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data, req->certs_len)) {
+ if (req.data_npages && report_req->certs_len &&
+ copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto e_free;
}
- if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
e_free:
- kfree(resp);
+ kfree(report_resp);
return ret;
}
@@ -1064,10 +1086,9 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops;
- /* initial the input address for guest request */
+ /* Initialize the input addresses for guest request */
snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request);
snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response);
- snp_dev->input.data_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->certs_data);
/* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */
sev_tsm_ops.privlevel_floor = vmpck_id;
--
2.34.1
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