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Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 19:59:15 -0400
From: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
To: chenridong <chenridong@...wei.com>, tj@...nel.org,
 lizefan.x@...edance.com, hannes@...xchg.org
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next] cgroup: fix uaf when proc_cpuset_show

On 6/23/24 22:59, chenridong wrote:
>
> On 2024/6/22 23:05, Waiman Long wrote:
>>
>> On 6/22/24 07:38, Chen Ridong wrote:
>>> We found a refcount UAF bug as follows:
>>>
>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cgroup_path_ns+0x112/0x150
>>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8882a4b242b8 by task atop/19903
>>>
>>> CPU: 27 PID: 19903 Comm: atop Kdump: loaded Tainted: GF
>>> Call Trace:
>>>   dump_stack+0x7d/0xa7
>>>   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
>>>   ? cgroup_path_ns+0x112/0x150
>>>   __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
>>>   ? print_unreferenced+0x390/0x3b0
>>>   ? cgroup_path_ns+0x112/0x150
>>>   kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
>>>   cgroup_path_ns+0x112/0x150
>>>   proc_cpuset_show+0x164/0x530
>>>   proc_single_show+0x10f/0x1c0
>>>   seq_read_iter+0x405/0x1020
>>>   ? aa_path_link+0x2e0/0x2e0
>>>   seq_read+0x324/0x500
>>>   ? seq_read_iter+0x1020/0x1020
>>>   ? common_file_perm+0x2a1/0x4a0
>>>   ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x380/0x380
>>>   ? bpf_lsm_file_permission_wrapper+0xa/0x30
>>>   ? security_file_permission+0x53/0x460
>>>   vfs_read+0x122/0x420
>>>   ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0
>>>   ? __ia32_sys_pwrite64+0x1e0/0x1e0
>>>   ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x741/0xa70
>>>   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
>>>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xcc
>>>
>>> This is also reported by: 
>>> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9b1ff7be974a403aa4cd
>>>
>>> This can be reproduced by the following methods:
>>> 1.add an mdelay(1000) before acquiring the cgroup_lock In the
>>>   cgroup_path_ns function.
>>> 2.$cat /proc/<pid>/cpuset   repeatly.
>>> 3.$mount -t cgroup -o cpuset cpuset /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/
>>> $umount /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/   repeatly.
>>>
>>> The race that cause this bug can be shown as below:
>>>
>>> (umount)        |    (cat /proc/<pid>/cpuset)
>>> css_release        |    proc_cpuset_show
>>> css_release_work_fn    |    css = task_get_css(tsk, cpuset_cgrp_id);
>>> css_free_rwork_fn    |    cgroup_path_ns(css->cgroup, ...);
>>> cgroup_destroy_root    |    mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
>>> rebind_subsystems    |
>>> cgroup_free_root     |
>>>             |    // cgrp was freed, UAF
>>>             |    cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp,..);
>>>
>>> When the cpuset is initialized, the root node top_cpuset.css.cgrp
>>> will point to &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp. In cgroup v1, the mount operation 
>>> will
>>> allocate cgroup_root, and top_cpuset.css.cgrp will point to the 
>>> allocated
>>> &cgroup_root.cgrp. When the umount operation is executed,
>>> top_cpuset.css.cgrp will be rebound to &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp.
>>>
>>> The problem is that when rebinding to cgrp_dfl_root, there are cases
>>> where the cgroup_root allocated by setting up the root for cgroup v1
>>> is cached. This could lead to a Use-After-Free (UAF) if it is
>>> subsequently freed. The descendant cgroups of cgroup v1 can only be
>>> freed after the css is released. However, the css of the root will 
>>> never
>>> be released, yet the cgroup_root should be freed when it is unmounted.
>>> This means that obtaining a reference to the css of the root does
>>> not guarantee that css.cgrp->root will not be freed.
>>>
>>> To solve this issue, we have added a cgroup reference count in
>>> the proc_cpuset_show function to ensure that css.cgrp->root will not
>>> be freed prematurely. This is a temporary solution. Let's see if anyone
>>> has a better solution.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@...wei.com>
>>> ---
>>>   kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>>>   1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
>>> index c12b9fdb22a4..782eaf807173 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
>>> @@ -5045,6 +5045,7 @@ int proc_cpuset_show(struct seq_file *m, 
>>> struct pid_namespace *ns,
>>>       char *buf;
>>>       struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
>>>       int retval;
>>> +    struct cgroup *root_cgroup = NULL;
>>>         retval = -ENOMEM;
>>>       buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> @@ -5052,9 +5053,28 @@ int proc_cpuset_show(struct seq_file *m, 
>>> struct pid_namespace *ns,
>>>           goto out;
>>>         css = task_get_css(tsk, cpuset_cgrp_id);
>>> +    rcu_read_lock();
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * When the cpuset subsystem is mounted on the legacy hierarchy,
>>> +     * the top_cpuset.css->cgroup does not hold a reference count of
>>> +     * cgroup_root.cgroup. This makes accessing css->cgroup very
>>> +     * dangerous because when the cpuset subsystem is remounted to the
>>> +     * default hierarchy, the cgroup_root.cgroup that css->cgroup 
>>> points
>>> +     * to will be released, leading to a UAF issue. To avoid this 
>>> problem,
>>> +     * get the reference count of top_cpuset.css->cgroup first.
>>> +     *
>>> +     * This is ugly!!
>>> +     */
>>> +    if (css == &top_cpuset.css) {
>>> +        cgroup_get(css->cgroup);
>>> +        root_cgroup = css->cgroup;
>>> +    }
>>> +    rcu_read_unlock();
>>>       retval = cgroup_path_ns(css->cgroup, buf, PATH_MAX,
>>>                   current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
>>>       css_put(css);
>>> +    if (root_cgroup)
>>> +        cgroup_put(root_cgroup);
>>>       if (retval == -E2BIG)
>>>           retval = -ENAMETOOLONG;
>>>       if (retval < 0)
>>
>> Thanks for reporting this UAF bug. Could you try the attached patch 
>> to see if it can fix the issue?
>>
>
> +/*
> + * With a cgroup v1 mount, root_css.cgroup can be freed. We need to 
> take a
> + * reference to it to avoid UAF as proc_cpuset_show() may access the 
> content
> + * of this cgroup.
> + */
>  static void cpuset_bind(struct cgroup_subsys_state *root_css)
>  {
> +    static struct cgroup *v1_cgroup_root;
> +
>      mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex);
> +    if (v1_cgroup_root) {
> +        cgroup_put(v1_cgroup_root);
> +        v1_cgroup_root = NULL;
> +    }
>      spin_lock_irq(&callback_lock);
>
>      if (is_in_v2_mode()) {
> @@ -4159,6 +4170,10 @@ static void cpuset_bind(struct 
> cgroup_subsys_state *root_css)
>      }
>
>      spin_unlock_irq(&callback_lock);
> +    if (!cgroup_subsys_on_dfl(cpuset_cgrp_subsys)) {
> +        v1_cgroup_root = root_css->cgroup;
> +        cgroup_get(v1_cgroup_root);
> +    }
>      mutex_unlock(&cpuset_mutex);
>  }
>
> Thanks for your suggestion. If we take a reference at rebind(call 
> ->bind()) function, cgroup_root allocated when setting up root for 
> cgroup v1 can never be released, because the reference count will 
> never be reduced to zero.
>
> We have already tried similar methods to fix this issue, however doing 
> so causes another issue as mentioned previously.

You are right. Taking the reference in cpuset_bind() will prevent 
cgroup_destroy_root() from being called. I had overlooked that.

Now I have an even simpler fix. Could you try the attached v2 patch to 
verify if that can fix the problem?

Thanks,
Longman

View attachment "v2-0001-cgroup-cpuset-Prevent-UAF-in-proc_cpuset_show.patch" of type "text/x-patch" (2216 bytes)

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