linux-kernel - [PATCH] f2fs: only fragment segment in the same section

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Message-Id: <20240625075839.3750112-1-shengyong@oppo.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:58:39 +0800
From: Sheng Yong <shengyong@...o.com>
To: jaegeuk@...nel.org,
	chao@...nel.org
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Sheng Yong <shengyong@...o.com>
Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: only fragment segment in the same section

If mode=fragment:xxx is enabled in large section mode, segno returned by
__get_next_segno() may located in new section with different type, which
messes up ssa type. This could be reproduced by the following steps:

  dd if=/dev/zero of=test.img bs=1M count=10240
  mkfs.f2fs -s 128 test.img
  mount -t f2fs test.img /mnt -o mode=fragment:block
  echo 1 > /sys/fs/f2fs/loop0/max_fragment_chunk
  echo 512 > /sys/fs/f2fs/loop0/max_fragment_hole
  dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/testfile bs=4K count=100
  umount /mnt

  F2FS-fs (loop0): Inconsistent segment (4377) type [0, 1] in SSA and SIT

In order to allow simulate segment fragmentation in large section mode,
this patch limits the random range within the same section.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <shengyong@...o.com>
---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
index a0ce3d080f80a..55d474f5c2103 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2782,10 +2782,21 @@ static unsigned int __get_next_segno(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
 {
 	struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
 	unsigned short seg_type = curseg->seg_type;
+	unsigned int hint;
 
 	sanity_check_seg_type(sbi, seg_type);
-	if (f2fs_need_rand_seg(sbi))
-		return get_random_u32_below(MAIN_SECS(sbi) * SEGS_PER_SEC(sbi));
+	if (f2fs_need_rand_seg(sbi)) {
+		if (__is_large_section(sbi)) {
+			hint = GET_SEC_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno);
+			if (GET_SEC_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno + 1) != hint)
+				return curseg->segno;
+			return get_random_u32_inclusive(curseg->segno + 1,
+					GET_SEG_FROM_SEC(sbi, hint + 1) - 1);
+		} else {
+			return get_random_u32_below(MAIN_SECS(sbi) *
+						SEGS_PER_SEC(sbi));
+		}
+	}
 
 	if (__is_large_section(sbi))
 		return curseg->segno;
-- 
2.40.1