linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

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Message-ID: <20240626073719.5246-1-amit@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2024 09:37:19 +0200
From: Amit Shah <amit@...nel.org>
To: seanjc@...gle.com,
	pbonzini@...hat.com,
	x86@...nel.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: amit.shah@....com,
	tglx@...utronix.de,
	mingo@...hat.com,
	bp@...en8.de,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	hpa@...or.com,
	kim.phillips@....com,
	david.kaplan@....com
Subject: [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

From: Amit Shah <amit.shah@....com>

Remove superfluous RSB filling after a VMEXIT when the CPU already has
flushed the RSB after a VMEXIT when AutoIBRS is enabled.

The initial implementation for adding RETPOLINES added an ALTERNATIVES
implementation for filling the RSB after a VMEXIT in

commit 117cc7a908c836 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")

Later, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT was added in

commit 2b129932201673 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")

The AutoIBRS (on AMD CPUs) feature implementation added in

commit e7862eda309ecf ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS")

used the already-implemented logic for EIBRS in
spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_on_vmexit() -- but did not update the
code at VMEXIT to act on the mode selected in that function -- resulting
in VMEXITs continuing to clear the RSB when RETPOLINES are enabled,
despite the presence of AutoIBRS.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@....com>

---
v2:
 - tweak commit message re: Boris's comments.
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
@@ -348,10 +346,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 
 2:	cli
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, consumes RDI (@svm) and RSI (@spec_ctrl_intercepted). */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
-- 
2.45.2