[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <87bk3bvhr1.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2024 20:03:14 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner
<brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Alejandro Colomar
<alx.manpages@...il.com>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Andrew
Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov
<dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang
<ericchiang@...gle.com>, Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Geert
Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris
<jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn
<jannh@...gle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet
<corbet@....net>, Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>, Lakshmi
Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Luca Boccassi
<bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, "Madhavan T .
Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski
<mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Miklos Szeredi
<mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Nicolas
Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell
<scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell
<sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve
Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Thibaut Sautereau
<thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, Vincent Strubel
<vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, Yin
Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
* Mickaël Salaün:
> Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be
> allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and
> dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's
> security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g.,
> which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any
> executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
Some distributions no longer set executable bits on most shared objects,
which I assume would interfere with AT_CHECK probing for shared objects.
Removing the executable bit is attractive because of a combination of
two bugs: a binutils wart which until recently always set the entry
point address in the ELF header to zero, and the kernel not checking for
a zero entry point (maybe in combination with an absent program
interpreter) and failing the execve with ELIBEXEC, instead of doing the
execve and then faulting at virtual address zero. Removing the
executable bit is currently the only way to avoid these confusing
crashes, so I understand the temptation.
Thanks,
Florian
Powered by blists - more mailing lists