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Message-Id: <a9724690-98f4-4ddb-841d-fcc9150e54c7@app.fastmail.com>
Date: Sat, 06 Jul 2024 10:34:40 -0400
From: "Zack Weinberg" <zack@...folio.org>
To: "Florian Weimer" <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
Cc: "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, jolsa@...nel.org,
mhiramat@...nel.org, cgzones@...glemail.com, brauner@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@...db.de>,
"Adhemerval Zanella" <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
Cristian RodrÃguez <cristian@...riguez.im>,
"Wilco Dijkstra" <Wilco.Dijkstra@....com>
Subject: Re: deconflicting new syscall numbers for 6.11
Without commenting on the rest of this...
On Sat, Jul 6, 2024, at 6:01 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> The arc4random implementation in glibc was never intended to displace
> randomness generation for cryptographic purposes.
...arc4random on the BSDs (particularly on OpenBSD) *is* intended to be
suitable for cryptographic purposes, and, simultaneously, intended to be
fast enough that user space programs should never hesitate to use it.
Therefore, Linux+glibc needs to be prepared for user space programs to
use it that way -- expecting both speed and cryptographic strength --
or else we shouldn't have added it at all.
zw
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