linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] rust: add flags for shadow call stack sanitizer

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Message-ID: <CABCJKufJz5Wu5ivbEuUFHJd8qk0M-W=WQDCOe-pR6w=4=YyEag@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2024 17:10:09 -0700
From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
To: Conor Dooley <conor@...nel.org>
Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, 
	Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Jamie Cunliffe <Jamie.Cunliffe@....com>, 
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>, Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, 
	Nicolas Schier <nicolas@...sle.eu>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, 
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>, 
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>, Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>, 
	Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>, 
	Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>, 
	Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>, Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@...sung.com>, 
	Valentin Obst <kernel@...entinobst.de>, linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, 
	rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] rust: add flags for shadow call stack sanitizer

On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 10:17 AM Conor Dooley <conor@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> For these security related options, like CFI_CLANG or RANDSTRUCT, I'm
> inclined to say that RUST is actually what should grow the depends on.
> That way it'll be RUST that gets silently disabled in configs when patch
> 1 gets backported (where it is mostly useless anyway) rather than SCS
> nor will it disable SCS when someone enables RUST in their config,
> instead it'd be a conscious choice.

I agree, we shouldn't silently disable hardening features when Rust is enabled.

Sami