Message-ID: <20240712-asi-rfc-24-v1-12-144b319a40d8@google.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 17:00:30 +0000
From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, 
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, 
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, 
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>, Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>, 
	Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@...cle.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, 
	Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, 
	Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@...il.com>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, 
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>, Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>, 
	Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>, Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>, 
	Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, 
	Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>, Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@...gle.com>, 
	Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>, Ofir Weisse <oweisse@...gle.com>, 
	Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@...gle.com>, Patrick Bellasi <derkling@...gle.com>, 
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...gle.com>, Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@...gle.com>, 
	Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 12/26] mm: asi: asi_exit() on PF, skip handling if address is accessible

From: Ofir Weisse <oweisse@...gle.com>

On a page-fault - do asi_exit(). Then check if now after the exit the
address is accessible. We do this by refactoring spurious_kernel_fault()
into two parts:

1. Verify that the error code value is something that could arise from a
lazy TLB update.
2. Walk the page table and verify permissions, which is now called
is_address_accessible(). We also define PTE_PRESENT() and PMD_PRESENT()
which are suitable for checking userspace pages. For the sake of
spurious faults,  pte_present() and pmd_present() are only good for
kernelspace pages. This is because these macros might return true even
if the present bit is 0 (only relevant for userspace).

Signed-off-by: Ofir Weisse <oweisse@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index bba4e020dd64..e0bc5006c371 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
 	force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address);
 }
 
-static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
+static __always_inline int kernel_protection_ok(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
 {
 	if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) && !pte_write(*pte))
 		return 0;
@@ -953,6 +953,9 @@ static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static inline_or_noinstr int kernel_access_ok(
+	unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd);
+
 /*
  * Handle a spurious fault caused by a stale TLB entry.
  *
@@ -978,11 +981,6 @@ static noinline int
 spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 {
 	pgd_t *pgd;
-	p4d_t *p4d;
-	pud_t *pud;
-	pmd_t *pmd;
-	pte_t *pte;
-	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause
@@ -998,6 +996,50 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 		return 0;
 
 	pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);
+	return kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, pgd);
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_kernel_fault);
+
+/*
+ * For kernel addresses, pte_present and pmd_present are sufficient for
+ * is_address_accessible. For user addresses these functions will return true
+ * even though the pte is not actually accessible by hardware (i.e _PAGE_PRESENT
+ * is not set). This happens in cases where the pages are physically present in
+ * memory, but they are not made accessible to hardware as they need software
+ * handling first:
+ *
+ * - ptes/pmds with _PAGE_PROTNONE need autonuma balancing (see pte_protnone(),
+ *   change_prot_numa(), and do_numa_page()).
+ *
+ * - pmds with _PAGE_PSE & !_PAGE_PRESENT are undergoing splitting (see
+ *   split_huge_page()).
+ *
+ * Here, we care about whether the hardware can actually access the page right
+ * now.
+ *
+ * These issues aren't currently present for PUD but we also have a custom
+ * PUD_PRESENT for a layer of future-proofing.
+ */
+#define PUD_PRESENT(pud) (pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_PRESENT)
+#define PMD_PRESENT(pmd) (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT)
+#define PTE_PRESENT(pte) (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT)
+
+/*
+ * Check if an access by the kernel would cause a page fault. The access is
+ * described by a page fault error code (whether it was a write/instruction
+ * fetch) and address. This doesn't check for types of faults that are not
+ * expected to affect the kernel, e.g. PKU. The address can be user or kernel
+ * space, if user then we assume the access would happen via the uaccess API.
+ */
+static inline_or_noinstr int
+kernel_access_ok(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+	int ret;
+
 	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1006,27 +1048,27 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (p4d_leaf(*p4d))
-		return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d);
+		return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d);
 
 	pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
-	if (!pud_present(*pud))
+	if (!PUD_PRESENT(*pud))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (pud_leaf(*pud))
-		return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pud);
+		return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pud);
 
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
-	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
+	if (!PMD_PRESENT(*pmd))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
-		return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd);
+		return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd);
 
 	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
-	if (!pte_present(*pte))
+	if (!PTE_PRESENT(*pte))
 		return 0;
 
-	ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, pte);
+	ret = kernel_protection_ok(error_code, pte);
 	if (!ret)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1034,12 +1076,11 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 	 * Make sure we have permissions in PMD.
 	 * If not, then there's a bug in the page tables:
 	 */
-	ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd);
+	ret = kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd);
 	WARN_ONCE(!ret, "PMD has incorrect permission bits\n");
 
 	return ret;
 }
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_kernel_fault);
 
 int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
 
@@ -1483,6 +1524,29 @@ handle_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	}
 }
 
+static __always_inline void warn_if_bad_asi_pf(
+	unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION
+	struct asi *target;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's a bug to access sensitive data from the "critical section", i.e.
+	 * on the path between asi_enter and asi_relax, where untrusted code
+	 * gets run. #PF in this state sees asi_intr_nest_depth() as 1 because
+	 * #PF increments it. We can't think of a better way to determine if
+	 * this has happened than to check the ASI pagetables, hence we can't
+	 * really have this check in non-debug builds unfortunately.
+	 */
+	VM_WARN_ONCE(
+		(target = asi_get_target(current)) != NULL &&
+		asi_intr_nest_depth() == 1 &&
+		!kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, asi_pgd(target)),
+		"ASI-sensitive data access from critical section, addr=%px error_code=%lx class=%s",
+		(void *) address, error_code, target->class->name);
+#endif
+}
+
 DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(exc_page_fault)
 {
 	irqentry_state_t state;
@@ -1490,6 +1554,31 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(exc_page_fault)
 
 	address = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? fred_event_data(regs) : read_cr2();
 
+	if (static_asi_enabled() && !user_mode(regs)) {
+		pgd_t *pgd;
+
+		/* Can be a NOP even for ASI faults, because of NMIs */
+		asi_exit();
+
+		/*
+		 * handle_page_fault() might oops if we run it for a kernel
+		 * address. This might be the case if we got here due to an ASI
+		 * fault. We avoid this case by checking whether the address is
+		 * now, after asi_exit(), accessible by hardware. If it is -
+		 * there's nothing to do. Note that this is a bit of a shotgun;
+		 * we can also bail early from user-address faults here that
+		 * weren't actually caused by ASI. So we might wanna move this
+		 * logic later in the handler. In particular, we might be losing
+		 * some stats here. However for now this keeps ASI page faults
+		 * nice and fast.
+		 */
+		pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address);
+		if (kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, pgd)) {
+			warn_if_bad_asi_pf(error_code, address);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
 	prefetchw(&current->mm->mmap_lock);
 
 	/*

-- 
2.45.2.993.g49e7a77208-goog

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