Message-ID: <CALmYWFt7X0v8k1N9=aX6BuT2gCiC9SeWwPEBckvBk8GQtb0rqQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 08:02:37 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, 
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, 
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, 
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, 
	Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, 
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, 
	Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, 
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, 
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	Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, 
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>, 
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, 
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, 
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, 
	Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>, 
	Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, 
	Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, 
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and
 SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits

On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:57 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:26:14AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 11:58:25AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > Here is another proposal:
> > >
> > > We can change a bit the semantic by making it the norm to always check
> > > file executability with AT_CHECK, and using the securebits to restrict
> > > file interpretation and/or command injection (e.g. user supplied shell
> > > commands).  Non-executable checked files can be reported/logged at the
> > > kernel level, with audit, configured by sysadmins.
> > >
> > > New securebits (feel free to propose better names):
> > >
> > > - SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE: requires AT_CHECK to pass.
> >
> > Would you want the enforcement of this bit done by userspace or the
> > kernel?
> >
> > IIUC, userspace would always perform AT_CHECK regardless of
> > SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, and then which would happen?
> >
> > 1) userspace would ignore errors from AT_CHECK when
> >    SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is unset
>
> Yes, that's the idea.
>
> >
> > or
> >
> > 2) kernel would allow all AT_CHECK when SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is
> >    unset
> >
> > I suspect 1 is best and what you intend, given that
> > SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE can only be enforced by userspace.
>
> Indeed. We don't want AT_CHECK's behavior to change according to
> securebits.
>
One bit is good.

> >
> > > - SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE: deny any command injection via
> > >   command line arguments, environment variables, or configuration files.
> > >   This should be ignored by dynamic linkers.  We could also have an
> > >   allow-list of shells for which this bit is not set, managed by an
> > >   LSM's policy, if the native securebits scoping approach is not enough.
> > >
> > > Different modes for script interpreters:
> > >
> > > 1. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 (default)
> > >    Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands.
> > >    => No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get
> > >    ahead of potential issues with logs to prepare for a migration to a
> > >    restrictive mode.
> > >
> > > 2. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=0
> > >    Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and allow
> > >    arbitrary user commands.
> > >    => Threat: (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not
> > >       fooled) users.  That could protect against unintended script
> > >       executions (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh).
> > >    ==> Makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
> > >
> > > 3. RESTRICT_FILE=1 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
> > >    Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
> > >    any arbitrary user commands.
> > >    => Threat: malicious scripts run by untrusted users.
> > >    ==> Makes sense for system services executing scripts.
> > >
> > > 4. RESTRICT_FILE=0 DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
> > >    Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
> > >    => Goal: monitor/measure/assess script content (e.g. with IMA/EVM) in
> > >       a system where the access rights are not (yet) ready.  Arbitrary
> > >       user commands would be much more difficult to monitor.
> > >    ==> First step of restricting system services that should not
> > >        directly pass arbitrary commands to shells.
> >
> > I like these bits!
>
> Good! Jeff, Steve, Florian, Matt, others, what do you think?

For below two cases: will they be restricted by one (or some) mode above ?

1> cat /tmp/a.sh | sh

2> sh -c "$(cat /tmp/a.sh)"

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