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Message-ID: <202407171426.4DE97F7@keescook>
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 14:28:29 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, kernel@...labora.com,
gbiv@...gle.com, inglorion@...gle.com, ajordanr@...gle.com,
Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: add config to block FOLL_FORCE in mem writes
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 01:53:35PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 02:13:58PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > +config SECURITY_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE
> > + bool "Remove FOLL_FORCE usage from /proc/pid/mem writes"
> > + default n
> > + help
> > + This restricts FOLL_FORCE flag usage in procfs mem write calls
> > + because it bypasses memory permission checks and can be used by
> > + attackers to manipulate process memory contents that would be
> > + otherwise protected.
> > +
> > + Enabling this will break GDB, gdbserver and other debuggers
> > + which require FOLL_FORCE for basic functionalities.
> > +
> > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> FOLL_FORCE is an internal flag, and people who aren't kernel developers aren't
> going to know what it is. Could this option be named and documented in a way
> that would be more understandable to people who aren't kernel developers? What
> is the effect on how /proc/pid/mem behaves?
"Do not bypass RO memory permissions via /proc/$pid/mem writes" ?
--
Kees Cook
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