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Message-Id: <5E1B12C1-1ACD-4A26-AC89-CC32327B51F5@collabora.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 15:09:09 -0300
From: Daniel Almeida <daniel.almeida@...labora.com>
To: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@...nel.org>
Cc: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>,
 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
 Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
 Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>,
 Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>,
 Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
 Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>,
 Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>,
 Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@...sung.com>,
 Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>,
 linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/5] doc: rust: create safety standard

Hi Danilo,


> 
> We can easily build abstractions that ensure that the address a driver is trying
> to access is mapped properly, such that you can't have accidential out-of-bound
> accesses.
> 
> Those can be implemented by the corresponding subsystem / bus that the resource
> originates from.
> 
> In fact, we already have abstractions for that on the way, a generic I/O
> abstraction [1] as base implementation and a specific abstraction for PCI bars
> [2].
> 
> Of course, if the MMIO region comes from let's say the device tree, we still
> have to assume that the information in the DT is correct, but the driver does
> not need unsafe code for this.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/20240618234025.15036-8-dakr@redhat.com/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/20240618234025.15036-11-dakr@redhat.com/
> 

Thanks for pointing that out. So from this:

+impl<const SIZE: usize> Io<SIZE> {
+ ///
+ ///
+ /// # Safety
+ ///
+ /// Callers must ensure that `addr` is the start of a valid I/O mapped memory region of size
+ /// `maxsize`.
+ pub unsafe fn new(addr: usize, maxsize: usize) -> Result<Self> {
+ if maxsize < SIZE {
+ return Err(EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ Ok(Self { addr, maxsize })
+ }

It looks like one can do this:

let io = unsafe { Io::new(<some address>, <some size>)? }; 
let value = io.readb(<some offset>)?;

Where <some address> has already been mapped for <some size> at an earlier point?

That’s fine, as I said, if an abstraction makes sense, I have nothing
against it. My point is more that we shouldn’t enact a blanket ban on
'unsafe' in drivers because corner cases do exist. But it’s good to know that this
particular example I gave does not apply.


>> 
>> If a driver is written partially in Rust, and partially in C, and it gets a
>> pointer to some kcalloc’d memory in C, should It be forbidden to use unsafe
>> in order to build a slice from that pointer? How can you possibly design a
>> general abstraction for something that is, essentially, a driver-internal API?
> 
> That sounds perfectly valid to me.
> 


— Daniel



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