linux-kernel - [PATCH] f2fs: avoid potential int overflow in sanity_check_area

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Message-ID: <20240724175158.11928-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 10:51:58 -0700
From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@...tech.ru>
To: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>
CC: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@...tech.ru>,
	<linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<lvc-project@...uxtesting.org>, <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: avoid potential int overflow in sanity_check_area_boundary()

While calculating the end addresses of main area and segment 0, u32
may be not enough to hold the result without the danger of int
overflow.

Just in case, play it safe and cast one of the operands to a
wider type (u64).
 
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static
analysis tool SVACE.

Fixes: fd694733d523 ("f2fs: cover large section in sanity check of super")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@...tech.ru>
---
 fs/f2fs/super.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
index 3959fd137cc9..4d8f38ca6fcd 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -3356,9 +3356,9 @@ static inline bool sanity_check_area_boundary(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	u32 segment_count = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
 	u32 log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
 	u64 main_end_blkaddr = main_blkaddr +
-				(segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg);
+				((u64)segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg);
 	u64 seg_end_blkaddr = segment0_blkaddr +
-				(segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg);
+				((u64)segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg);
 
 	if (segment0_blkaddr != cp_blkaddr) {
 		f2fs_info(sbi, "Mismatch start address, segment0(%u) cp_blkaddr(%u)",