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Message-ID: <20240725124851.645981d3@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 12:48:51 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@...adcom.com>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, Masami Hiramatsu
 <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Ilkka Naulapää
 <digirigawa@...il.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Al
 Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, regressions@...mhuis.info, Dan Carpenter
 <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>, Vasavi Sirnapalli
 <vasavi.sirnapalli@...adcom.com>, Alexey Makhalov
 <alexey.makhalov@...adcom.com>, Florian Fainelli
 <florian.fainelli@...adcom.com>
Subject: Re: tracing: user events UAF crash report

On Thu, 25 Jul 2024 21:45:03 +0530
Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@...adcom.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 5:38 PM Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net> wrote:
> >
> > On 22.07.24 13:13, Ajay Kaher wrote:  
> > > On Sat, Jul 20, 2024 at 2:17 AM Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net> wrote:  
> > >>
> > >> I noticed, the user events ftrace selftest is crashing every now and
> > >> then in our automated tests. Digging into, I found that the following
> > >> is triggering the issue very reliable:
> > >>
> > >> - in one shell, as root:
> > >>   # while true; do ./kselftest/user_events/ftrace_test; done
> > >>
> > >> - in a second shell, again as root:
> > >>   # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
> > >>   # while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null
> > >>  
> > >
> > > Tried to reproduced on 6.10.0-rc7-100.ph5+, only getting repeated output as:  
> 
> < sending again after correcting alignments >
> 
> Mathias, thanks for reporting. I am able to reproduce the 'KASAN:
> slab-use-after-free'.
> 
> Steve, let me know if anything wrong in my investigation:

Hi Ajay,

Thanks for analyzing this.

> 
> [ 6264.339882] ==================================================================
> [ 6264.339970] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in f_start+0x2b5/0x370
> 
> This belongs to  f_start() ->  f_next() -> trace_get_fields():
> 
>     trace_get_fields(struct trace_event_call *event_call)
>     {
>         if (!event_call->class->get_fields)
>         return &event_call->class->fields;
>         return event_call->class->get_fields(event_call);
>     }
> 
> This happens while reading 'events/user_events/__test_event/format'.
> 
> 
> Allocation:
> [ 6264.347212] Allocated by task 3287:
> [ 6264.348247]  kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
> [ 6264.348256]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x40
> [ 6264.348260]  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x50
> [ 6264.348265]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xb3/0xc0
> [ 6264.348268]  kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x168/0x330
> [ 6264.348280]  user_event_parse_cmd+0x57b/0x26c0
> [ 6264.348286]  user_events_ioctl+0xa92/0x1850
> [ 6264.348290]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x1b0
> [ 6264.348295]  x64_sys_call+0x9a4/0x1f20
> [ 6264.348299]  do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
> 
> user_event_parse_cmd() -> user_event_parse() {
>     .
>     user = kzalloc(sizeof(*user), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> 
> Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.10/source/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c#L2118
> 
> 
> Freed:
> [ 6264.350333]  kfree+0xd1/0x2b0
> [ 6264.350337]  destroy_user_event.part.0+0x313/0x450
> [ 6264.350341]  destroy_user_event+0x129/0x1a0
> [ 6264.350344]  delayed_destroy_user_event+0x62/0xd0
> [ 6264.350347]  process_one_work+0x621/0xf60
> [ 6264.350359]  worker_thread+0x760/0x14f0
> 
> static int destroy_user_event(struct user_event *user) {
>     .
>     kfree(user->call.print_fmt);
>     kfree(EVENT_NAME(user));
>     kfree(user);  <--
> 
> Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.10/source/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c#L1510
> 
> 
> Race condition:
> 
> Thread A i.e. event reader able to reach the f_start() as the path is
> valid. Thread A waiting for lock. At the sametime, Thread B has
> acquired lock and removing events entry followed by free the
> user_event object. Later once Thread A got the lock it tried to read
> address which belongs to struct trace_event_call (struct
> trace_event_call is member of struct user_event)
> 
> Thread A (read event)                      Thread B (remove event)
> 
> .                                                        worker_thread()
> .
> delayed_destroy_user_event()
> .                                                               ->
> acquire event_mutex
> .                                                        destroy_user_event()
> vfs_read()                                         .
> seq_read()                                        .
> f_start() -> acquire event_mutex      eventfs_remove_dir()
> . (waiting)                                          kfree(user)
> . (waiting)                                          -> released event_mutex
> acquired event_mutex
> f_next()
> trace_get_fields():

What really bothers me is that refcnt logic. I'm not sure if this is an
issue, but the fact that you can inc the refcnt without holding the
event_mutex looks wrong to me. I would guess it would WARN if that refcnt
was incremented when zero, but there is a window where it gets set to 1
again. Too bad there's not a way to do a refcnt_set_if_zero() or something
to atomically set the value but warn if it's not zero. But then again, if
it did get incremented when zero, there should have been a warning then too.

But I don't think that's causing this.

Will look further.

-- Steve


> 
> I think you have added the following check in f_start() to prevent
> this race condition, but somehow with eventfs still some gap to race condition.
> 
> static void *f_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) {
>     mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
>     if (!event_file_data(m->private))   <--
>         return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
> 
> -Ajay


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