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Message-ID: <CAG48ez1=xbGd8az4+iNJ_v1z4McMN8dsvWff-PH=ozLYnbzPqg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 16:21:01 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] keys: Restrict KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT according to ptrace_may_access()
On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 4:09 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 03:49:29PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 2:59 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> > > A process can modify its parent's credentials with
> > > KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT when their EUID and EGID are the same. This
> > > doesn't take into account all possible access controls.
> > >
> > > Enforce the same access checks as for impersonating a process.
> > >
> > > The current credentials checks are untouch because they check against
> > > EUID and EGID, whereas ptrace_may_access() checks against UID and GID.
> >
> > FWIW, my understanding is that the intended usecase of
> > KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT is that command-line tools (like "keyctl
> > new_session" and "e4crypt new_session") want to be able to change the
> > keyring of the parent process that spawned them (which I think is
> > usually a shell?); and Yama LSM, which I think is fairly widely used
> > at this point, by default prevents a child process from using
> > PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH on its parent.
>
> About Yama, the patched keyctl_session_to_parent() function already
> check if the current's and the parent's credentials are the same before
> this new ptrace_may_access() check.
prepare_exec_creds() in execve() always creates new credentials which
are stored in bprm->cred and then later committed in begin_new_exec().
Also, fork() always copies the credentials in copy_creds().
So the "mycred == pcred" condition in keyctl_session_to_parent()
basically never applies, I think.
Also: When that condition is true, the whole operation is a no-op,
since if the credentials are the same, then the session keyring that
the credentials point to must also be the same.
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