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Message-ID: <20240731150811.156771-3-nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 20:37:53 +0530
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <mingo@...hat.com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<pgonda@...gle.com>, <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<nikunj@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 02/20] virt: sev-guest: Rename local guest message variables
Rename local guest message variables for more clarity
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 117 ++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 7d343f2c6ef8..a72fe1e959c2 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -291,45 +291,45 @@ static int dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
- struct snp_guest_msg *resp = &snp_dev->secret_response;
- struct snp_guest_msg *req = &snp_dev->secret_request;
- struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_hdr = &req->hdr;
- struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;
+ struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg = &snp_dev->secret_response;
+ struct snp_guest_msg *req_msg = &snp_dev->secret_request;
+ struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_msg_hdr = &req_msg->hdr;
+ struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_msg_hdr = &resp_msg->hdr;
pr_debug("response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
- resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version,
- resp_hdr->msg_sz);
+ resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_msg_hdr->msg_type, resp_msg_hdr->msg_version,
+ resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz);
/* Copy response from shared memory to encrypted memory. */
- memcpy(resp, snp_dev->response, sizeof(*resp));
+ memcpy(resp_msg, snp_dev->response, sizeof(*resp_msg));
/* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */
- if (unlikely(resp_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_hdr->msg_seqno + 1)))
+ if (unlikely(resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_msg_hdr->msg_seqno + 1)))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Verify response message type and version number. */
- if (resp_hdr->msg_type != (req_hdr->msg_type + 1) ||
- resp_hdr->msg_version != req_hdr->msg_version)
+ if (resp_msg_hdr->msg_type != (req_msg_hdr->msg_type + 1) ||
+ resp_msg_hdr->msg_version != req_msg_hdr->msg_version)
return -EBADMSG;
/*
* If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return
* an error.
*/
- if (unlikely((resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len) > sz))
+ if (unlikely((resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len) > sz))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Decrypt the payload */
- return dec_payload(snp_dev, resp, payload, resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len);
+ return dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_msg, payload, resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len);
}
static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type,
void *payload, size_t sz)
{
- struct snp_guest_msg *req = &snp_dev->secret_request;
- struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &req->hdr;
+ struct snp_guest_msg *msg = &snp_dev->secret_request;
+ struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
- memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+ memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM;
hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8
pr_debug("request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);
- return __enc_payload(snp_dev, req, payload, sz);
+ return __enc_payload(snp_dev, msg, payload, sz);
}
static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,
@@ -496,8 +496,8 @@ struct snp_req_resp {
static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
- struct snp_report_req *req = &snp_dev->req.report;
- struct snp_report_resp *resp;
+ struct snp_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.report;
+ struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
int rc, resp_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_user(report_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
@@ -513,30 +513,29 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
- resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!resp)
+ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
+ report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!report_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
- rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, req, sizeof(*req), resp->data,
- resp_len);
+ rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ,
+ report_req, sizeof(*report_req), report_resp->data, resp_len);
if (rc)
goto e_free;
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
e_free:
- kfree(resp);
+ kfree(report_resp);
return rc;
}
static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
- struct snp_derived_key_req *req = &snp_dev->req.derived_key;
+ struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req = &snp_dev->req.derived_key;
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
- struct snp_derived_key_resp resp = {0};
+ struct snp_derived_key_resp derived_key_resp = {0};
int rc, resp_len;
/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
u8 buf[64 + 16];
@@ -551,25 +550,27 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp.data) + crypto->a_len;
+ resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp.data) + crypto->a_len;
if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (copy_from_user(req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_user(derived_key_req, (void __user *)arg->req_data,
+ sizeof(*derived_key_req)))
return -EFAULT;
- rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, req, sizeof(*req), buf, resp_len);
+ rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ,
+ derived_key_req, sizeof(*derived_key_req), buf, resp_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
- memcpy(resp.data, buf, sizeof(resp.data));
- if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
+ memcpy(derived_key_resp.data, buf, sizeof(derived_key_resp.data));
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &derived_key_resp,
+ sizeof(derived_key_resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
- memzero_explicit(&resp, sizeof(resp));
+ memzero_explicit(&derived_key_resp, sizeof(derived_key_resp));
return rc;
}
@@ -577,9 +578,9 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
struct snp_req_resp *io)
{
- struct snp_ext_report_req *req = &snp_dev->req.ext_report;
+ struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.ext_report;
struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
- struct snp_report_resp *resp;
+ struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
sockptr_t certs_address;
@@ -588,22 +589,22 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data))
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_sockptr(req, io->req_data, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_from_sockptr(report_req, io->req_data, sizeof(*report_req)))
return -EFAULT;
/* caller does not want certificate data */
- if (!req->certs_len || !req->certs_address)
+ if (!report_req->certs_len || !report_req->certs_address)
goto cmd;
- if (req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
+ if (report_req->certs_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(report_req->certs_len, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (sockptr_is_kernel(io->resp_data)) {
- certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)req->certs_address);
+ certs_address = KERNEL_SOCKPTR((void *)report_req->certs_address);
} else {
- certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)req->certs_address);
- if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, req->certs_len))
+ certs_address = USER_SOCKPTR((void __user *)report_req->certs_address);
+ if (!access_ok(certs_address.user, report_req->certs_len))
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -613,45 +614,45 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
* the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy
* zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided.
*/
- memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, req->certs_len);
- npages = req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, report_req->certs_len);
+ npages = report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
cmd:
/*
* The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
- resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
- resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!resp)
+ resp_len = sizeof(report_resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
+ report_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!report_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
snp_dev->input.data_npages = npages;
- ret = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg,
- SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req->data,
- sizeof(req->data), resp->data, resp_len);
+ ret = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ,
+ &report_req->data, sizeof(report_req->data),
+ report_resp->data, resp_len);
/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */
if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) {
- req->certs_len = snp_dev->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ report_req->certs_len = snp_dev->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, req, sizeof(*req)))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req)))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
if (ret)
goto e_free;
- if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data, req->certs_len)) {
+ if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data, report_req->certs_len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto e_free;
}
- if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(io->resp_data, report_resp, sizeof(*report_resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
e_free:
- kfree(resp);
+ kfree(report_resp);
return ret;
}
--
2.34.1
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