linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] Landlock: Add signal control

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Message-ID: <CAG48ez1q80onUxoDrFFvGmoWzOhjRaXzYpu+e8kNAHzPADvAAg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 03:10:54 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, 
	outreachy@...ts.linux.dev, gnoack@...gle.com, paul@...l-moore.com, 
	jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com, 
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] Landlock: Add signal control

On Thu, Aug 8, 2024 at 1:36 AM Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 07, 2024 at 08:16:47PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 06, 2024 at 11:55:27PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2024 at 8:56 PM Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2024 at 8:11 PM Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > Currently, a sandbox process is not restricted to send a signal
> > > > > (e.g. SIGKILL) to a process outside of the sandbox environment.
> > > > > Ability to sending a signal for a sandboxed process should be
> > > > > scoped the same way abstract unix sockets are scoped. Therefore,
> > > > > we extend "scoped" field in a ruleset with
> > > > > "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL" to specify that a ruleset will deny
> > > > > sending any signal from within a sandbox process to its
> > > > > parent(i.e. any parent sandbox or non-sandboxed procsses).
> > > [...]
> > > > > +       if (is_scoped)
> > > > > +               return 0;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +       return -EPERM;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > > > > +                                   struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
> >
> > I was wondering if we should handle this case, but I guess it makes
> > sense to have a consistent policy for all kind of user-triggerable
> > signals.
> >
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +       bool is_scoped;
> > > > > +       const struct landlock_ruleset *dom, *target_dom;
> > > > > +       struct task_struct *result = get_pid_task(fown->pid, fown->pid_type);
> > > >
> > > > I'm not an expert on how the fowner stuff works, but I think this will
> > > > probably give you "result = NULL" if the file owner PID has already
> > > > exited, and then the following landlock_get_task_domain() would
> > > > probably crash? But I'm not entirely sure about how this works.
> > > >
> > > > I think the intended way to use this hook would be to instead use the
> > > > "file_set_fowner" hook to record the owning domain (though the setup
> > > > for that is going to be kind of a pain...), see the Smack and SELinux
> > > > definitions of that hook. Or alternatively maybe it would be even
> > > > nicer to change the fown_struct to record a cred* instead of a uid and
> > > > euid and then use the domain from those credentials for this hook...
> > > > I'm not sure which of those would be easier.
> > >
> > > (For what it's worth, I think the first option would probably be
> > > easier to implement and ship for now, since you can basically copy
> > > what Smack and SELinux are already doing in their implementations of
> > > these hooks. I think the second option would theoretically result in
> > > nicer code, but it might require a bit more work, and you'd have to
> > > include the maintainers of the file locking code in the review of such
> > > refactoring and have them approve those changes. So if you want to get
> > > this patchset into the kernel quickly, the first option might be
> > > better for now?)
> > >
> >
> > I agree, let's extend landlock_file_security with a new "fown" pointer
> > to a Landlock domain. We'll need to call landlock_get_ruleset() in
> > hook_file_send_sigiotask(), and landlock_put_ruleset() in a new
> > hook_file_free_security().
> I think we should add a new hook (hook_file_set_owner()) to initialize
> the "fown" pointer and call landlock_get_ruleset() in that?

Yeah. Initialize the pointer in the file_set_fowner hook, and read the
pointer in the file_send_sigiotask hook.

Note that in the file_set_fowner hook, you'll probably need to use
both landlock_get_ruleset() (to take a reference on the ruleset you're
storing in the fown pointer) and landlock_put_ruleset() (to drop the
reference to the ruleset that the fown pointer was pointing to
before). And you'll need to use some kind of lock to protect the fown
pointer - either by adding an appropriate lock next to your fown
pointer or by using some appropriate existing lock in "struct file".
Probably it's cleanest to have your own lock for this? (This lock will
have to be something like a spinlock, not a mutex, since you need to
be able to acquire it in the file_set_fowner hook, which runs inside
an RCU read-side critical section, where sleeping is forbidden -
acquiring a mutex can sleep and therefore is forbidden in this
context, acquiring a spinlock can't sleep.)

> If we do not
> have hook_file_set_owner to store domain in "fown", can you please give
> me a hint on where to do that?
> Thanks
> > I would be nice to to replace the redundant informations in fown_struct
> > but that can wait.