linux-kernel - [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)

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Message-ID: <20240809190319.1710470-2-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Fri,  9 Aug 2024 12:02:58 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, 
	Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>, Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and
 SEV-SNP (and TDX)

Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't
directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must
explicitly request emulation.  Unless the guest explicitly requests
emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO
SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.

But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs,
because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the
SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on
writes.  Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to
emulation, the guest never gets a #VC.  And since KVM simply resumes the
guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU
into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.

Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for
upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs.  For TDX, it's actually possible
to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the
fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX
protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0.  But there is no strong use case for
supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is
to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory.
And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the
restriction can always be lifted for TDX.

Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES
VMs that are created as type KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.  Read-only memslots can't
possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just
means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs.
Trying to deal with the ordering between KVM_SEV_INIT and memslot creation
isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.

Fixes: 26c44aa9e076 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")
Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
 include/linux/kvm_host.h        | 7 +++++++
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c             | 5 ++---
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 950a03e0181e..37c4a573e5fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2191,6 +2191,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
 #endif

+#define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
+
 static inline u16 kvm_read_ldt(void)
 {
 	u16 ldt;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 689e8be873a7..62a3d1c0cc07 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -715,6 +715,13 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 #endif

+#ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem
+static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM);
+}
+#endif
+
 struct kvm_memslots {
 	u64 generation;
 	atomic_long_t last_used_slot;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index d0788d0a72cc..fad2d5932844 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1578,15 +1578,14 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD)
 		valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;

-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM
 	/*
 	 * GUEST_MEMFD is incompatible with read-only memslots, as writes to
 	 * read-only memslots have emulated MMIO, not page fault, semantics,
 	 * and KVM doesn't allow emulated MMIO for private memory.
 	 */
-	if (!(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
+	if (kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) &&
+	    !(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
 		valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
-#endif

 	if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog