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Message-ID: <22b5182a-24f1-3bf0-78bb-762f9d8fc26b@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2024 15:04:34 +0530
From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@....com>
To: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini
<pbonzini@...hat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
On 8/2/2024 7:27 AM, Kim Phillips wrote:
> From: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@....com>
>
> AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows
> the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for or by a
> guest [1]. The ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature can be used by the hypervisor
> to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the
> hypervisor does not want to be enabled.
>
> When ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES is enabled, a VMRUN will fail if any
> non-reserved bits are 1 in SEV_FEATURES but are 0 in
> ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
>
> [1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
> Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
>
> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A. Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index f0dea3750ca9..59516ad2028b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
> u64 avic_physical_id; /* Offset 0xf8 */
> u8 reserved_7[8];
> u64 vmsa_pa; /* Used for an SEV-ES guest */
> - u8 reserved_8[720];
> + u8 reserved_8[40];
> + u64 allowed_sev_features; /* Offset 0x138 */
> + u8 reserved_9[672];
> /*
> * Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved
> * for use by hypervisor/software.
> @@ -294,6 +296,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
> (SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION | \
> SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION)
>
> +#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
> +
> struct vmcb_seg {
> u16 selector;
> u16 attrib;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index a16c873b3232..d12b4d615b32 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> int *error)
> {
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> int ret;
> @@ -908,6 +909,10 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES))
> + svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID |
> + sev->vmsa_features;
> +
> /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
> ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
> if (ret)
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