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Message-ID: <20240814071424.2655666-3-jeffxu@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 07:14:24 +0000
From: jeffxu@...omium.org
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	willy@...radead.org,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	Liam.Howlett@...cle.com,
	pedro.falcato@...il.com
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
	jeffxu@...gle.com,
	lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com,
	mpe@...erman.id.au,
	oliver.sang@...el.com,
	vbabka@...e.cz,
	keescook@...omium.org,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/2] mseal: refactor mremap to remove can_modify_mm

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>

mremap doesn't allow relocate, expand, shrink across VMA boundaries,
refactor the code to check src address range before doing anything on
the destination.

This also allow we remove can_modify_mm from mremap, since
the src address must be single VMA, use can_modify_vma instead.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
---
 mm/internal.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++
 mm/mremap.c   | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 mm/mseal.c    | 17 ------------
 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
index b4d86436565b..53f0bbbc6449 100644
--- a/mm/internal.h
+++ b/mm/internal.h
@@ -1501,6 +1501,24 @@ bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
 		unsigned long end);
 bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
 		unsigned long end, int behavior);
+
+static inline bool vma_is_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return (vma->vm_flags & VM_SEALED);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if a vma is sealed for modification.
+ * return true, if modification is allowed.
+ */
+static inline bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 #else
 static inline int can_do_mseal(unsigned long flags)
 {
@@ -1518,6 +1536,12 @@ static inline bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
 {
 	return true;
 }
+
+static inline bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index e7ae140fc640..3c5bb671a280 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -904,28 +904,7 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
 
 	/*
 	 * In mremap_to().
-	 * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
-	 *
-	 * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
-	 * does its own checking for address range, and we only
-	 * check the sealing after passing those checks.
-	 *
-	 * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
-		/*
-		 * In mremap_to().
-		 * VMA is moved to dst address, and munmap dst first.
-		 * do_munmap will check if dst is sealed.
-		 */
-		ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len, uf_unmap_early);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out;
-	}
-
 	if (old_len > new_len) {
 		ret = do_munmap(mm, addr+new_len, old_len - new_len, uf_unmap);
 		if (ret)
@@ -939,6 +918,26 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Since we can't remap across vma boundaries,
+	 * check single vma instead of src address range.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma))) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
+		/*
+		 * In mremap_to().
+		 * VMA is moved to dst address, and munmap dst first.
+		 * do_munmap will check if dst is sealed.
+		 */
+		ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len, uf_unmap_early);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* MREMAP_DONTUNMAP expands by old_len since old_len == new_len */
 	if (flags & MREMAP_DONTUNMAP &&
 		!may_expand_vm(mm, vma->vm_flags, old_len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
@@ -1079,19 +1078,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
-	 * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
-	 * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
-	 *
-	 * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
-	 * shrink/expand together.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
-		ret = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
 	 * the unnecessary pages..
@@ -1107,7 +1093,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		}
 
 		ret = do_vmi_munmap(&vmi, mm, addr + new_len, old_len - new_len,
-				    &uf_unmap, true);
+				&uf_unmap, true);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1124,6 +1110,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Since we can't remap across vma boundaries,
+	 * check single vma instead of src address range.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma))) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* old_len exactly to the end of the area..
 	 */
 	if (old_len == vma->vm_end - addr) {
@@ -1132,9 +1127,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 		/* can we just expand the current mapping? */
 		if (vma_expandable(vma, delta)) {
 			long pages = delta >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-			VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, vma->vm_end);
 			long charged = 0;
 
+			VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, vma->vm_end);
+
 			if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
 				if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, pages)) {
 					ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1177,20 +1173,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
 		unsigned long map_flags = 0;
+
 		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
 			map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
 
 		new_addr = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, 0, new_len,
-					vma->vm_pgoff +
-					((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT),
-					map_flags);
+				vma->vm_pgoff +
+				((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT),
+				map_flags);
 		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(new_addr)) {
 			ret = new_addr;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr,
-			       &locked, flags, &uf, &uf_unmap);
+				&locked, flags, &uf, &uf_unmap);
 	}
 out:
 	if (offset_in_page(ret))
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index bf783bba8ed0..4591ae8d29c2 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -16,28 +16,11 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
-static inline bool vma_is_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-	return (vma->vm_flags & VM_SEALED);
-}
-
 static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	vm_flags_set(vma, VM_SEALED);
 }
 
-/*
- * check if a vma is sealed for modification.
- * return true, if modification is allowed.
- */
-static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-	if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
-		return false;
-
-	return true;
-}
-
 static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior)
 {
 	return	behavior &
-- 
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog


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