linux-kernel - Re: x86/kaslr: Expose and use the end of the physical memory address space

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Message-ID: <202408150911.25D8591@keescook>
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 09:11:14 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@...dia.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
	max8rr8@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	jhubbard@...dia.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@...uxfoundation.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
	Oscar Salvador <osalvador@...e.de>, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: x86/kaslr: Expose and use the end of the physical memory address
 space

On Wed, Aug 14, 2024 at 12:29:36AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid
> ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this
> happens due to KASLR.
> 
> KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to
> randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap
> regions.  It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the
> installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug
> memory.  This limitation is done to gain more randomization space
> because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc,
> vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing.
> 
> The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so
> the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still
> operate under the assumption that the available address space can be
> determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.
> 
> request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1
> downwards.  That means the first allocation happens past the end of the
> direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which
> causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently
> causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses.
> 
> MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization
> does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places
> which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits.  All
> remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found
> to be correct.
> 
> Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use
> that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places
> instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END
> maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and
> otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before.
> 
> To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers
> trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END.
> 
> Fixes: 0483e1fa6e09 ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions")
> Reported-by: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@...il.com>
> Reported-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@...dia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>

Nice fix; thanks!

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>

-- 
Kees Cook