linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 08/10] x86/tdx: Add a restriction on access to MMIO address

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Message-ID: <7a4c51f7ccd11c3197f05a1affd6fdbcfad6baad.1723807851.git.legion@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 15:43:58 +0200
From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev
Cc: "Alexey Gladkov (Intel)" <legion@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...el.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
	Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@...il.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
	Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	cho@...rosoft.com,
	decui@...rosoft.com,
	John.Starks@...rosoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 08/10] x86/tdx: Add a restriction on access to MMIO address

From: "Alexey Gladkov (Intel)" <legion@...nel.org>

In the case of userspace MMIO, if the user instruction + MAX_INSN_SIZE
straddles page, then the "fetch" in the kernel could trigger a #VE. In
this case the kernel would handle this second #VE as a !user_mode() MMIO.
That way, additional address verifications can be avoided.

The scenario of accessing userspace MMIO addresses from kernelspace does
not seem appropriate under normal circumstances. Until there is a
specific usecase for such a scenario it can be disabled.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index e3d692342603..94541ee724db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -411,6 +411,11 @@ static inline bool is_private_gpa(u64 gpa)
 	return gpa == cc_mkenc(gpa);
 }
 
+static inline bool is_kernel_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return (long)addr < 0;
+}
+
 static int get_phys_addr(unsigned long addr, phys_addr_t *phys_addr, bool *writable)
 {
 	unsigned int level;
@@ -592,6 +597,7 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 	unsigned long vaddr;
 	int size, ret;
 
+
 	ret = decode_insn_struct(&insn, regs);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -600,6 +606,11 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mmio == INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!user_mode(regs) && !is_kernel_addr(ve->gla)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Access to userspace address is not supported");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	vaddr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
 
 	if (current->mm) {
-- 
2.45.2