Message-ID: <1FFB2F15-EB60-4EAD-AEB0-6895D3E216C1@fb.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 17:42:42 +0000
From: Song Liu <songliubraving@...a.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
CC: Song Liu <songliubraving@...a.com>,
        Christian Brauner
	<brauner@...nel.org>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
        bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...a.com>,
        "andrii@...nel.org" <andrii@...nel.org>,
        "eddyz87@...il.com"
	<eddyz87@...il.com>,
        "ast@...nel.org" <ast@...nel.org>,
        "daniel@...earbox.net" <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "martin.lau@...ux.dev"
	<martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
        "viro@...iv.linux.org.uk" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        "jack@...e.cz" <jack@...e.cz>,
        "kpsingh@...nel.org" <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
        "mattbobrowski@...gle.com" <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
        Liam Wisehart
	<liamwisehart@...a.com>, Liang Tang <lltang@...a.com>,
        Shankaran
 Gnanashanmugam <shankaran@...a.com>,
        LSM List
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Günther Noack
	<gnoack@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add tests for
 bpf_get_dentry_xattr


> On Aug 20, 2024, at 5:45 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 08:35:53PM +0000, Song Liu wrote:
>> Hi Mickaël, 
>> 
>>> On Aug 19, 2024, at 6:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>> 
>> [...]
>> 
>>>> But because landlock works with a deny-by-default security policy this
>>>> is ok and it takes overmounts into account etc.
>>> 
>>> Correct. Another point is that Landlock uses the file's path (i.e.
>>> dentry + mnt) to walk down to the parent.  Only using the dentry would
>>> be incorrect for most use cases (i.e. any system with more than one
>>> mount point).
>> 
>> Thanks for highlighting the difference. Let me see whether we can bridge
>> the gap for this set. 
>> 
>> [...]
>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1. Change security_inode_permission to take dentry instead of inode.
>>>> 
>>>> Sorry, no.
>>>> 
>>>>> 2. Still add bpf_dget_parent. We will use it with security_inode_permission
>>>>>  so that we can propagate flags from parents to children. We will need
>>>>>  a bpf_dput as well. 
>>>>> 3. There are pros and cons with different approaches to implement this
>>>>>  policy (tags on directory work for all files in it). We probably need 
>>>>>  the policy writer to decide with one to use. From BPF's POV, dget_parent
>>>>>  is "safe", because it won't crash the system. It may encourage some bad
>>>>>  patterns, but it appears to be required in some use cases.
>>>> 
>>>> You cannot just walk a path upwards and check permissions and assume
>>>> that this is safe unless you have a clear idea what makes it safe in
>>>> this scenario. Landlock has afaict. But so far you only have a vague
>>>> sketch of checking permissions walking upwards and retrieving xattrs
>>>> without any notion of the problems involved.
>>> 
>>> Something to keep in mind is that relying on xattr to label files
>>> requires to deny sanboxed processes to change this xattr, otherwise it
>>> would be trivial to bypass such a sandbox.  Sandboxing must be though as
>>> a whole and Landlock's design for file system access control takes into
>>> account all kind of file system operations that could bypass a sandbox
>>> policy (e.g. mount operations), and also protects from impersonations.
>> 
>> Thanks for sharing these experiences! 
>> 
>>> What is the use case for this patch series?  Couldn't Landlock be used
>>> for that?
>> 
>> We have multiple use cases. We can use Landlock for some of them. The 
>> primary goal of this patchset is to add useful building blocks to BPF LSM
>> so that we can build effective and flexible security policies for various
>> use cases. These building blocks alone won't be very useful. For example,
>> as you pointed out, to make xattr labels useful, we need some policies 
>> for xattr read/write.
>> 
>> Does this make sense?
> 
> Yes, but I think you'll end up with a code pretty close to the Landlock
> implementation.

At the moment, I think it is not possible to do full Landlock logic in
BPF. We are learning from other LSMs. 

> What about adding BPF hooks to Landlock?  User space could create
> Landlock sandboxes that would delegate the denials to a BPF program,
> which could then also allow such access, but without directly handling
> nor reimplementing filesystem path walks.  The Landlock user space ABI
> changes would mainly be a new landlock_ruleset_attr field to explicitly
> ask for a (system-wide) BPF program to handle access requests if no
> Landlock rule allow them.  We could also tie a BPF data (i.e. blob) to
> Landlock domains for consistent sandbox management.  One of the
> advantage of this approach is to only run related BPF programs if the
> sandbox policy would deny the request.  Another advantage would be to
> leverage the Landlock user space interface to let any program partially
> define and extend their security policy.

Given there is BPF LSM, I have never thought about adding BPF hooks to 
Landlock or other LSMs. I personally would prefer to have a common API
to walk the path, maybe something like vma_iterator. But I need to read
more code to understand whether this makes sense?

Thanks,
Song

> I'm working on implementing audit support for Landlock [1] and I think
> these changes could be useful to implement BPF hooks to run a dedicated
> BPF program type per event (see landlock_log_denial() and struct
> landlock_request).  I'll get back on this patch series in September.
> 
> [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git/log/?h=wip-audit

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