linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify

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Message-ID: <CABi2SkUBH+utreVMTd1qEBSvXTPM7Qc1GiwNKjVa9+EeZK8WWA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 09:15:52 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...il.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, 
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>, 
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, oliver.sang@...el.com, 
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, 
	Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] mm/munmap: Replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma

On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 5:18 PM Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...il.com> wrote:
>
> We were doing an extra mmap tree traversal just to check if the entire
> range is modifiable. This can be done when we iterate through the VMAs
> instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...il.com>
> ---
>  mm/mmap.c | 11 +----------
>  mm/vma.c  | 19 ++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index 3af256bacef3..30ae4cb5cec9 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1740,16 +1740,7 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>                 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct list_head *uf,
>                 bool unlock)
>  {
> -       struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> -
> -       /*
> -        * Check if memory is sealed, prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
> -        * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> -        */
> -       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
> -               return -EPERM;
Another approach to improve perf  is to clone the vmi (since it
already point to the first vma), and pass the cloned vmi/vma into
can_modify_mm check, that will remove the cost of re-finding the first
VMA.

The can_modify_mm then continues from cloned VMI/vma till the end of
address range, there will be some perf cost there.  However,  most
address ranges in the real world are within a single VMA,  in
practice, the perf cost is the same as checking the single VMA, 99.9%
case.

This will help preserve the nice sealing feature (if one of the vma is
sealed, the entire address range is not modified)

> -
> -       return do_vmi_align_munmap(vmi, vma, mm, start, end, uf, unlock);
> +       return do_vmi_align_munmap(vmi, vma, vma->vm_mm, start, end, uf, unlock);
>  }
>
>  /*
> diff --git a/mm/vma.c b/mm/vma.c
> index 84965f2cd580..5850f7c0949b 100644
> --- a/mm/vma.c
> +++ b/mm/vma.c
> @@ -712,6 +712,12 @@ do_vmi_align_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>                 if (end < vma->vm_end && mm->map_count >= sysctl_max_map_count)
>                         goto map_count_exceeded;
>
> +               /* Don't bother splitting the VMA if we can't unmap it anyway */
> +               if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) {
> +                       error = -EPERM;
> +                       goto start_split_failed;
> +               }
> +
>                 error = __split_vma(vmi, vma, start, 1);
>                 if (error)
>                         goto start_split_failed;
> @@ -723,6 +729,11 @@ do_vmi_align_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>          */
>         next = vma;
>         do {
> +               if (!can_modify_vma(next)) {
> +                       error = -EPERM;
> +                       goto modify_vma_failed;
> +               }
> +
>                 /* Does it split the end? */
>                 if (next->vm_end > end) {
>                         error = __split_vma(vmi, next, end, 0);
> @@ -815,6 +826,7 @@ do_vmi_align_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>         __mt_destroy(&mt_detach);
>         return 0;
>
> +modify_vma_failed:
>  clear_tree_failed:
>  userfaultfd_error:
>  munmap_gather_failed:
> @@ -860,13 +872,6 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mm_struct *mm,
>         if (end == start)
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
> -       /*
> -        * Check if memory is sealed, prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
> -        * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
> -        */
> -       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
> -               return -EPERM;
> -
>         /* Find the first overlapping VMA */
>         vma = vma_find(vmi, end);
>         if (!vma) {
>
> --
> 2.46.0
>