linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB

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Message-ID: <93effd6c-124e-07fd-57ca-ed271fb50665@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 11:06:00 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
 Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
 Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
 Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's
 IBPB

On 8/16/24 13:25, Jim Mattson wrote:
> From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
> enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
> and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
> "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
> predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
> on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
> indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
> near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
> that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
> predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
> logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
> 
> On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
> predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
> 
> However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
> mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
> enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
> 
> Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
> accordingly.
> 
> [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
> [2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
> [3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
> [4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
> 
> Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
> Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
> ---
>  v2: Use IBPB_RET to identify semantic equality (Venkatesh)
> 
>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 ++++++--
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 2617be544480..044bdc9e938b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
>  	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
>  	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
>  
> -	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
> @@ -759,8 +761,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
>  	 * arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
>  	 * record that in cpufeatures so use them.
>  	 */
> -	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);

Should IBPB_RET be conditionally set? I would think that you would only
want to set IBPB_RET if either IBPB_RET or SPEC_CTRL is set on the hypervisor.

		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) ||
		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)
			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);

Right?

Thanks,
Tom

> +	}
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))