linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] ceph: fix out-of-bound array access when doing a file read

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Message-ID: <87msl3lea0.fsf@linux.dev>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 11:33:27 +0100
From: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...ux.dev>
To: Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com>
Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>,  ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org,
  linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ceph: fix out-of-bound array access when doing a
 file read

On Fri, Aug 23 2024, Xiubo Li wrote:

> On 8/22/24 23:01, Luis Henriques (SUSE) wrote:
>> If, while doing a read, the inode is updated and the size is set to zero,
>> __ceph_sync_read() may not be able to handle it.  It is thus easy to hit a
>> NULL pointer dereferrence by continuously reading a file while, on another
>> client, we keep truncating and writing new data into it.
>>
>> This patch fixes the issue by adding extra checks to avoid integer overflows
>> for the case of a zero size inode.  This will prevent the loop doing page
>> copies from running and thus accessing the pages[] array beyond num_pages.
>>
>> Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/67524
>> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <luis.henriques@...ux.dev>
>> ---
>> Hi!
>>
>> Please note that this patch is only lightly tested and, to be honest, I'm
>> not sure if this is the correct way to fix this bug.  For example, if the
>> inode size is 0, then maybe ceph_osdc_wait_request() should have returned
>> 0 and the problem would be solved.  However, it seems to be returning the
>> size of the reply message and that's not something easy to change.  Or maybe
>> I'm just reading it wrong.  Anyway, this is just an RFC to see if there's
>> other ideas.
>>
>> Also, the tracker contains a simple testcase for crashing the client.
>>
>>   fs/ceph/file.c | 7 ++++---
>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c
>> index 4b8d59ebda00..dc23d5e5b11e 100644
>> --- a/fs/ceph/file.c
>> +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c
>> @@ -1200,9 +1200,9 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos,
>>   		}
>>     		idx = 0;
>> -		if (ret <= 0)
>> +		if ((ret <= 0) || (i_size == 0))
>
> Hi Luis,
>
> This change looks incorrect to me.
>
> As I mentioned before when the 'IFILE' lock is in MIX state the 'Frw' caps could
> be issued to multiple clients at the same time. Which means the file could be
> updated by another client and the local 'i_size' may haven't been changed in
> time. So in this case the 'ret' will be larger than '0' and the 'i_size' could
> be '0'.
>
>
>>   			left = 0;
>> -		else if (off + ret > i_size)
>> +		else if ((i_size >= off) && (off + ret > i_size))
>
> And the 'off' also could equal to little than the 'i_size'.

(I forgot to comment here.)

This change is _exactly_ what will prevent the NULL pointer from
occurring, because if 'i_size' is 0, then:

		left = i_size - off;

will leave 'left' with a huge value.  And the loop 'while (left > 0) {}'
will execute until the access to 'pages[idx]' crashes.

Cheers,
-- 
Luís

> BTW, could you reproduce the crash issue ?
>
> Thanks
>
> - Xiubo
>
>>   			left = i_size - off;
>>   		else
>>   			left = ret;
>> @@ -1210,6 +1210,7 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos,
>>   			size_t plen, copied;
>>     			plen = min_t(size_t, left, PAGE_SIZE - page_off);
>> +			WARN_ON_ONCE(idx >= num_pages);
>>   			SetPageUptodate(pages[idx]);
>>   			copied = copy_page_to_iter(pages[idx++],
>>   						   page_off, plen, to);
>> @@ -1234,7 +1235,7 @@ ssize_t __ceph_sync_read(struct inode *inode, loff_t *ki_pos,
>>   	}
>>     	if (ret > 0) {
>> -		if (off >= i_size) {
>> +		if ((i_size >= *ki_pos) && (off >= i_size)) {
>>   			*retry_op = CHECK_EOF;
>>   			ret = i_size - *ki_pos;
>>   			*ki_pos = i_size;
>>
>