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Message-ID: <02949473-328f-4dae-b778-d939dc9bba6c@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 17:15:56 -0500
From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/tdx: Fix crash on kexec with CONFIG_EISA
Hello Kirill,
On 8/26/2024 10:52 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 8/26/24 07:25, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> On Sat, Aug 24, 2024 at 11:29:39PM +0100, Maciej W. Rozycki wrote:
>>> On Thu, 22 Aug 2024, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>
>>>> This issue causes real problems:
>>>>
>>>> 1. If the kernel is compiled with EISA support, it will attempt to probe
>>>> EISA by reading 4 bytes from the 0x0FFFD9 address (see eisa_bus_probe()).
>>>> The kernel treats this read as MMIO and accesses this memory via
>>>> shared mapping as we do for MMIO.
>>>>
>>>> KVM converts memory to shared upon such access.
>>>>
>>>> 2. The same memory range (0xF0000-0x100000) is scanned to look for the MP
>>>> table (see mpparse_find_mptable()). However, this is not MMIO and it
>>>> is accessed via private mapping.
>>>>
>>>> This will cause a crash if the memory is not private.
>>>>
>>>> During normal boot, the kernel scans for SMP information before probing
>>>> for EISA, and it boots fine. However, the memory becomes shared and causes
>>>> issues on kexec when the second kernel attempts to scan for SMP information.
>>> ISTM that `eisa_bus_probe' has to be updated to `memremap' analogously to
>>> `mpparse_find_mptable', complementing changes such as commit f7750a795687
>>> ("x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap() for RAM
>>> mappings") or commit 5997efb96756 ("x86/boot: Use memremap() to map the
>>> MPF and MPC data"). Both just access BIOS memory.
>>>
>>> Can you please try and verify if my proposed change at:
>>> <https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2408242025210.30766@angie.orcam.me.uk>
>>> has fixed the problem for you?
>> I like the direction your patch took. I hate sprinkling
>> X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST checks over the kernel.
>>
>> Unfortunately, it is not enough to fix the issue. memremap() in this case
>> will still boil down to ioremap() that would set shared bit:
>>
>> memremap()
>> arch_memremap_wb()
>> ioremap_cache()
>> __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
>>
>> I think arch_memremap_wb() should be mapped ioremap_encrypted() in x86
>> case. See the patch below.
>>
>> It seems to be working fine on TDX, but I am not sure about SEV.
>>
>> Tom, any comments?
> I haven't dug through the code that thoroughly, but I don't think making
> arch_memremap_wb() be ioremap_encrypted() will work for SME, where some
> data, e.g. setup data, is unencrypted and needs to be mapped shared.
>
> Let me add @Ashish to the thread and have him investigate this since he
> has been working on the kexec support under SNP. Can someone provide the
> specific kernel options that need to be in place?
As Tom asked for, please provide the specific kernel options to test with this configuration.
Thanks, Ashish
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> index 1d60427379c9..ef79cbef1ef8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> @@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, un
>> extern void __iomem *ioremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size);
>> #define ioremap_encrypted ioremap_encrypted
>>
>> +#define arch_memremap_wb ioremap_encrypted
>> +
>> /**
>> * ioremap - map bus memory into CPU space
>> * @offset: bus address of the memory
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