linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: Clean up coalesced MMIO ring full check

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20240828181446.652474-3-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 11:14:46 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, 
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>, Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ilias Stamatis <ilstam@...zon.com>, 
	Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>, 
	Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paul Durrant <paul@....org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: Clean up coalesced MMIO ring full check

Fold coalesced_mmio_has_room() into its sole caller, coalesced_mmio_write(),
as it's really just a single line of code, has a goofy return value, and
is unnecessarily brittle.

E.g. if coalesced_mmio_has_room() were to check ring->last directly, or
the caller failed to use READ_ONCE(), KVM would be susceptible to TOCTOU
attacks from userspace.

Opportunistically add a comment explaining why on earth KVM leaves one
entry free, which may not be obvious to readers that aren't familiar with
ring buffers.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Ilias Stamatis <ilstam@...zon.com>
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul@....org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c | 29 ++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c b/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c
index 184c5c40c9c1..375d6285475e 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c
@@ -40,25 +40,6 @@ static int coalesced_mmio_in_range(struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static int coalesced_mmio_has_room(struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev, u32 last)
-{
-	struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_ring *ring;
-
-	/* Are we able to batch it ? */
-
-	/* last is the first free entry
-	 * check if we don't meet the first used entry
-	 * there is always one unused entry in the buffer
-	 */
-	ring = dev->kvm->coalesced_mmio_ring;
-	if ((last + 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX == READ_ONCE(ring->first)) {
-		/* full */
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	return 1;
-}
-
 static int coalesced_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				struct kvm_io_device *this, gpa_t addr,
 				int len, const void *val)
@@ -72,9 +53,15 @@ static int coalesced_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	spin_lock(&dev->kvm->ring_lock);
 
+	/*
+	 * last is the index of the entry to fill.  Verify userspace hasn't
+	 * set last to be out of range, and that there is room in the ring.
+	 * Leave one entry free in the ring so that userspace can differentiate
+	 * between an empty ring and a full ring.
+	 */
 	insert = READ_ONCE(ring->last);
-	if (!coalesced_mmio_has_room(dev, insert) ||
-	    insert >= KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX) {
+	if (insert >= KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX ||
+	    (insert + 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX == READ_ONCE(ring->first)) {
 		spin_unlock(&dev->kvm->ring_lock);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
-- 
2.46.0.295.g3b9ea8a38a-goog