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Message-ID: <202408310649.X413mMQP-lkp@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2024 06:48:48 +0800
From: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, paul@...l-moore.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@...ts.linux.dev, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
mic@...ikod.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Hi Casey,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test WARNING on pcmoore-selinux/next zohar-integrity/next-integrity linus/master v6.11-rc5 next-20240830]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/LSM-Add-the-lsmblob-data-structure/20240830-085050
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240830003411.16818-3-casey%40schaufler-ca.com
patch subject: [PATCH v2 02/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
config: i386-randconfig-061-20240830 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240831/202408310649.X413mMQP-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240831/202408310649.X413mMQP-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408310649.X413mMQP-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:654:53: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types) @@ expected unsigned int [usertype] secid @@ got struct lsmblob * @@
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:654:53: sparse: expected unsigned int [usertype] secid
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:654:53: sparse: got struct lsmblob *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:663:53: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types) @@ expected unsigned int [usertype] secid @@ got struct lsmblob * @@
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:663:53: sparse: expected unsigned int [usertype] secid
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:663:53: sparse: got struct lsmblob *
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c: note: in included file:
include/linux/list.h:83:21: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to true
include/linux/list.h:83:21: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to true
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1666:52: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to false
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1701:55: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to false
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1728:55: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to false
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1754:55: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to false
include/linux/list.h:83:21: sparse: sparse: self-comparison always evaluates to true
vim +654 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
553
554 /**
555 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
556 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
557 * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
558 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
559 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
560 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
561 * @func: LIM hook identifier
562 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
563 * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
564 *
565 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
566 */
567 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
568 struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
569 struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
570 u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
571 const char *func_data)
572 {
573 int i;
574 bool result = false;
575 struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule;
576 bool rule_reinitialized = false;
577
578 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
579 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
580 return false;
581
582 switch (func) {
583 case KEY_CHECK:
584 case CRITICAL_DATA:
585 return ((rule->func == func) &&
586 ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred));
587 default:
588 break;
589 }
590
591 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
592 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
593 return false;
594 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
595 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
596 return false;
597 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
598 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
599 return false;
600 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
601 && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
602 return false;
603 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
604 !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
605 return false;
606 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
607 return false;
608 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
609 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
610 if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
611 && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
612 && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
613 return false;
614 } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
615 return false;
616 }
617 if ((rule->flags & IMA_GID) && !rule->gid_op(cred->gid, rule->gid))
618 return false;
619 if (rule->flags & IMA_EGID) {
620 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETGID)) {
621 if (!rule->gid_op(cred->egid, rule->gid)
622 && !rule->gid_op(cred->sgid, rule->gid)
623 && !rule->gid_op(cred->gid, rule->gid))
624 return false;
625 } else if (!rule->gid_op(cred->egid, rule->gid))
626 return false;
627 }
628 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
629 !rule->fowner_op(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode),
630 rule->fowner))
631 return false;
632 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FGROUP) &&
633 !rule->fgroup_op(i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode),
634 rule->fgroup))
635 return false;
636 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
637 int rc = 0;
638 struct lsmblob blob = { };
639
640 if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) {
641 if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p)
642 continue;
643 else
644 return false;
645 }
646
647 retry:
648 switch (i) {
649 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
650 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
651 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
652 /* scaffolding */
653 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob.scaffold.secid);
> 654 rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&blob, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
655 Audit_equal,
656 lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
657 break;
658 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
659 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
660 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
661 /* scaffolding */
662 blob.scaffold.secid = secid;
663 rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&blob, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
664 Audit_equal,
665 lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
666 break;
667 default:
668 break;
669 }
670
671 if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
672 lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
673 if (lsm_rule) {
674 rule_reinitialized = true;
675 goto retry;
676 }
677 }
678 if (!rc) {
679 result = false;
680 goto out;
681 }
682 }
683 result = true;
684
685 out:
686 if (rule_reinitialized) {
687 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
688 ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
689 kfree(lsm_rule);
690 }
691 return result;
692 }
693
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
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