linux-kernel - Re: Question on get random long worse in VM than on host

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Message-ID: <86y14dun1f.wl-maz@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2024 09:14:20 +0100
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: Tangnianyao <tangnianyao@...wei.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
	oliver.upton@...ux.dev,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
	"guoyang (C)" <guoyang2@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: Question on get random long worse in VM than on host

On Sat, 31 Aug 2024 08:56:23 +0100,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org> wrote:
> 
> As for RNDR/RNDRRS vs TRNG: the former is not a raw entropy source, it
> is a DRBG (or CSPRNG) which provides cryptographically secure random
> numbers whose security strength is limited by the size of the seed.
> TRNG does not have this limitation in principle, although non-p KVM
> happily seeds it from the kernel's entropy pool, which has the same
> limitation in practice.

Is that something we should address? I assume that this has an impact
on the quality of the provided random numbers?

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.