linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/2] mm: make copy_to_kernel_nofault() not fault on user addresses

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ZtXZFc9kZAUMD4e0@telecaster>
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 08:26:13 -0700
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@...ndov.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	loongarch@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
	linux-um@...ts.infradead.org, kernel-team@...com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] mm: make copy_to_kernel_nofault() not fault on user
 addresses

On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 10:56:27AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 02.09.24 08:31, Omar Sandoval wrote:
> > On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 08:19:33AM +0200, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Le 02/09/2024 à 07:31, Omar Sandoval a écrit :
> > > > [Vous ne recevez pas souvent de courriers de osandov@...ndov.com. Découvrez pourquoi ceci est important à https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
> > > > 
> > > > From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@...com>
> > > > 
> > > > Hi,
> > > > 
> > > > I hit a case where copy_to_kernel_nofault() will fault (lol): if the
> > > > destination address is in userspace and x86 Supervisor Mode Access
> > > > Prevention is enabled. Patch 2 has the details and the fix. Patch 1
> > > > renames a helper function so that its use in patch 2 makes more sense.
> > > > If the rename is too intrusive, I can drop it.
> > > 
> > > The name of the function is "copy_to_kernel". If the destination is a user
> > > address, it is not a copy to kernel but a copy to user and you already have
> > > the function copy_to_user() for that. copy_to_user() properly handles SMAP.
> > 
> > I'm not trying to copy to user. I am (well, KDB is) trying to copy to an
> > arbitrary address, and I want it to return an error instead of crashing
> > if the address is not a valid kernel address. As far as I can tell, that
> > is the whole point of copy_to_kernel_nofault().
> 
> The thing is that you (well, KDB) triggers something that would be
> considered a real BUG when triggered from "ordinary" (non-debugging) code.

If that's the case, then it's a really weird inconsistency that it's OK
to call copy_from_kernel_nofault() with an invalid address but a bug to
call copy_to_kernel_nofault() on the same address. Again, isn't the
whole point of these functions to fail gracefully instead of crashing on
invalid addresses? (Modulo the offline and hwpoison cases you mention
for /proc/kcore.)

> But now I am confused: "if the destination address is in userspace" does not
> really make sense in the context of KDB, no?
> 
>   [15]kdb> mm 0 1234
>   [   94.652476] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
> 0000000000000000
> 
> Why is address 0 in "user space"? "Which" user space?

Sure, it's not really user space, but it's below TASK_SIZE_MAX, so
things like handle_page_fault() and fault_in_kernel_space() treat it as
if it were a user address. I could
s/userspace address/address that is less than TASK_SIZE_MAX or is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)/.

> Isn't the problem here that KDB lets you blindly write to any non-existing
> memory address?
> 
> 
> Likely it should do some proper filtering like we do in fs/proc/kcore.c:
> 
> Take a look at the KCORE_RAM case where we make sure the page exists, is
> online and may be accessed. Only then, we trigger a
> copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Note that the KCORE_USER is a corner case only
> for some special thingies on x86 (vsyscall), and can be ignored for our case
> here.

Sure, it would be better to harden KDB against all of these special
cases. But you can break things in all sorts of fun ways with a
debugger, anyways. The point of this patch is that it's nonsense that a
function named copy_to_kernel_nofault() does indeed fault in a trivial
case like address < TASK_SIZE_MAX.

Thanks,
Omar