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Message-Id: <1f3f1992b2abeb8e5d7aa61b854e1b0721978b9a.1725657728.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 15:30:07 -0600
From: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
To: outreachy@...ts.linux.dev
Cc: mic@...ikod.net,
gnoack@...gle.com,
paul@...l-moore.com,
jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com,
jannh@...gle.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/6] sample/landlock: Support sample for signal scoping restriction
A sandboxer can receive the character "s" as input from the environment
variable LL_SCOPE to restrict itself from sending a signal to a process
outside its scoped domain.
Example
=======
Create a sandboxed shell and pass the character "s" to LL_SCOPED:
LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=. LL_SCOPED="s" ./sandboxer /bin/bash
Try to send a SIGTRAP to a process with process ID <PID> through:
kill -SIGTRAP <PID>
The sandboxed process should not be able to send the signal.
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>
---
v4:
- Make it compatible with changes in abstract UNIX socket scoping sample
v3:
- Add a restrict approach on input of LL_SCOPED, so it only allows
zero or one "s" to be the input.
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 18d072c23a23..618fbf70d38f 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -191,11 +191,13 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
struct landlock_ruleset_attr *ruleset_attr)
{
bool abstract_scoping = false;
+ bool signal_scoping = false;
bool ret = true;
char *env_type_scope, *env_type_scope_next, *ipc_scoping_name;
/* scoping is not supported by Landlock ABI */
- if (!(ruleset_attr->scoped & LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET))
+ if (!(ruleset_attr->scoped &
+ (LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL)))
return ret;
env_type_scope = getenv(env_var);
@@ -212,6 +214,9 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
strsep(&env_type_scope_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
if (strcmp("a", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 && !abstract_scoping) {
abstract_scoping = true;
+ } else if (strcmp("s", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
+ !signal_scoping) {
+ signal_scoping = true;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported scoping \"%s\"\n",
ipc_scoping_name);
@@ -221,6 +226,8 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
}
if (!abstract_scoping)
ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
+ if (!signal_scoping)
+ ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL;
out_free_name:
free(env_type_scope);
return ret;
@@ -265,7 +272,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
.handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
- .scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+ .scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
+ LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL,
};
if (argc < 2) {
@@ -302,7 +310,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
"%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
"%s=\"9418\" "
"%s=\"80:443\" "
- "%s=\"a\" "
+ "%s=\"a:s\" "
"%s bash -i\n\n",
ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ENV_SCOPED_NAME, argv[0]);
@@ -376,7 +384,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 5:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET for ABI < 6 */
- ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
+ ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
+ LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL);
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
"to leverage Landlock features "
--
2.34.1
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