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Message-ID: <20240911081615.262202-3-bhe@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2024 16:16:15 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@....com,
	dyoung@...hat.com,
	daniel.kiper@...cle.com,
	noodles@...com,
	lijiang@...hat.com,
	kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
	x86@...nel.org,
	Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/mm/sme: fix the kdump kernel breakage on SME system when CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y

Recently, it's reported that kdump kernel is broken during bootup on
SME system when CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. When debugging, I noticed this
can be traced back to commit ("b69a2afd5afc x86/kexec: Carry forward
IMA measurement log on kexec"). Just nobody ever tested it on SME
system when enabling CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC.

--------------------------------------------------
 ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
 Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates
 Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 18ae0bc7e79b64700122bb1d6a904b070fef2656'
 ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256
 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xcfacfdfe6660003e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2+ #14
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS 1.20.0 05/03/2023
 RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x420
 Code: ff 48 c7 85 10 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 48 c7 85 18 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 48 85 f6 0f 84 09 03 00 00 48 83 fa 17 0f 86 ff 02 00 00 <66> 83 3e 01 49 89 f4 0f 85 90 94 7d 00 48 83 7e 10 ff 0f 84 74 94
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000053c80 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000053d03 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: e48066052d5df359 RSI: cfacfdfe6660003e RDI: cfacfdfe66600056
 RBP: ffffc90000053d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82de1a88
 R10: ffffc90000053da0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 00000000000001a4
 R13: ffffc90000053df0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888040200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f2c744050e8 CR3: 000080004110e000 CR4: 00000000003506b0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
  ? ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x6e/0xf0
  ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
  ? die_addr+0x3c/0x60
  ? exc_general_protection+0x178/0x410
  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x420
  ? vprintk_emit+0x1f0/0x270
  ? ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x6e/0xf0
  ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x6e/0xf0
  ima_init+0x52/0xb0
  ? __pfx_init_ima+0x10/0x10
  init_ima+0x26/0xc0
  ? __pfx_init_ima+0x10/0x10
  do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x300
  do_initcalls+0xdf/0x100
  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
  kernel_init_freeable+0x147/0x1a0
  kernel_init+0x1a/0x140
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in:
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x420
 Code: ff 48 c7 85 10 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 48 c7 85 18 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 48 85 f6 0f 84 09 03 00 00 48 83 fa 17 0f 86 ff 02 00 00 <66> 83 3e 01 49 89 f4 0f 85 90 94 7d 00 48 83 7e 10 ff 0f 84 74 94
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000053c80 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000053d03 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: e48066052d5df359 RSI: cfacfdfe6660003e RDI: cfacfdfe66600056
 RBP: ffffc90000053d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82de1a88
 R10: ffffc90000053da0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 00000000000001a4
 R13: ffffc90000053df0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888040200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f2c744050e8 CR3: 000080004110e000 CR4: 00000000003506b0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
 Kernel Offset: disabled
 Rebooting in 10 seconds..
--------------------------------------------------

>From debugging printing, the stored addr and size of ima_kexec buffer
are not decrypted correctly like:
 ------
 ima: ima_load_kexec_buffer, buffer:0xcfacfdfe6660003e, size:0xe48066052d5df359
 ------

There are three pieces of setup_data info passed to kexec/kdump kernel:
SETUP_EFI, SETUP_IMA and SETUP_RNG_SEED. However, among them, only
ima_kexec buffer suffered from the incorrect decryption. After
debugging, it's because of a code bug in early_memremap_is_setup_data()
where checking the embedded content inside setup_data takes wrong range
calculation. The "len" variable in struct setup_data is the length of
the "data" field and does not include the size of the struct, which is
the reason for the miscalculation.

In this case, the length of efi data, rng_seed and ima_kexec are 0x70,
0x20, 0x10, and the length of setup_data is 0x10. When checking if data
is inside the embedded conent of setup_data, the starting address of
efi data and rng_seed happened to land in the wrong calculated range.
While the ima_kexec's starting address unluckily doesn't pass the
checking, then error occurred.

Here fix the code bug to make kexec/kdump kernel boot up successfully.

And also fix the similar buggy code in memremap_is_setup_data() which
are found out during code reviewing.

Fixes: b3c72fc9a78e ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index f1ee8822ddf1..4cadc7ef1cb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 		paddr_next = data->next;
 		len = data->len;
 
-		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len))) {
+		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + sd_size + len))) {
 			memunmap(data);
 			return true;
 		}
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 		paddr_next = data->next;
 		len = data->len;
 
-		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len))) {
+		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + sd_size + len))) {
 			early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
 			return true;
 		}
-- 
2.41.0


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