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Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-15-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:37 -0500
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation
Restructure spectre_v2 to use select/update/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.
The spectre_v2 mitigation may be updated based on the selected retbleed
mitigation.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index da6ca2fc939d..32ebe9e934fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);
@@ -209,6 +211,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
* After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
* choices.
*/
+ spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
retbleed_update_mitigation();
spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
mds_update_mitigation();
@@ -217,6 +220,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
rfds_update_mitigation();
spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
+ spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
retbleed_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
@@ -1794,18 +1798,18 @@ static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void)
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
- enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ spectre_v2_cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
/*
* If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
* then nothing to do.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
- (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+ (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
return;
- switch (cmd) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
@@ -1849,10 +1853,29 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
break;
}
- if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE &&
+ retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
} else {
@@ -1861,7 +1884,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
- switch (mode) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
break;
@@ -1888,13 +1911,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
* JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
* prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
*/
- if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
- spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
- pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
/*
* If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
@@ -1937,7 +1959,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
+ spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(spectre_v2_enabled);
/*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
@@ -1960,13 +1982,11 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("Enabling Speculation Barrier for firmware calls\n");
}
- } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+ !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
-
- /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
- spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
}
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
--
2.34.1
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