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Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-28-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:50 -0500
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v1 mitigation is
required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5fbf5a274c9f..d7e154031c93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1114,6 +1114,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+ if (!should_mitigate_vuln(SPECTRE_V1))
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
}
static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
--
2.34.1
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