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Message-ID: <50B10485E86A3208+20240912082500.1469-2-luming.yu@shingroup.cn>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 16:24:59 +0800
From: Luming Yu <luming.yu@...ngroup.cn>
To: linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mpe@...erman.id.au,
npiggin@...il.com,
christophe.leroy@...roup.eu,
jialong.yang@...ngroup.cn,
luming.yu@...il.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] powerpc/entry: entry clean up for common entry
From: Yu Luming <luming.yu@...il.com>
clean up do_syscall_trace_enter/leave and do_seccomp
Signed-off-by: Luming Yu <luming.yu@...ngroup.cn>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 5 -
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c | 141 ----------------------------
2 files changed, 146 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c
index 7fe704946e96..609ba48034de 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c
@@ -296,11 +296,6 @@ notrace unsigned long syscall_exit_prepare(unsigned long r3,
regs->gpr[3] = r3;
}
- if (unlikely(ti_flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE)) {
- do_syscall_trace_leave(regs);
- ret |= _TIF_RESTOREALL;
- }
-
local_irq_disable();
ret = interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main(ret, regs);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
index 727ed4a14545..6cd180bc36ab 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
#include <asm/debug.h>
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
-
#include "ptrace-decl.h"
/*
@@ -195,144 +192,6 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
return ret;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
-static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * The ABI we present to seccomp tracers is that r3 contains
- * the syscall return value and orig_gpr3 contains the first
- * syscall parameter. This is different to the ptrace ABI where
- * both r3 and orig_gpr3 contain the first syscall parameter.
- */
- regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
-
- /*
- * We use the __ version here because we have already checked
- * TIF_SECCOMP. If this fails, there is nothing left to do, we
- * have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put
- * something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
- */
- if (__secure_computing(NULL))
- return -1;
-
- /*
- * The syscall was allowed by seccomp, restore the register
- * state to what audit expects.
- * Note that we use orig_gpr3, which means a seccomp tracer can
- * modify the first syscall parameter (in orig_gpr3) and also
- * allow the syscall to proceed.
- */
- regs->gpr[3] = regs->orig_gpr3;
-
- return 0;
-}
-#else
-static inline int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; }
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
-
-/**
- * do_syscall_trace_enter() - Do syscall tracing on kernel entry.
- * @regs: the pt_regs of the task to trace (current)
- *
- * Performs various types of tracing on syscall entry. This includes seccomp,
- * ptrace, syscall tracepoints and audit.
- *
- * The pt_regs are potentially visible to userspace via ptrace, so their
- * contents is ABI.
- *
- * One or more of the tracers may modify the contents of pt_regs, in particular
- * to modify arguments or even the syscall number itself.
- *
- * It's also possible that a tracer can choose to reject the system call. In
- * that case this function will return an illegal syscall number, and will put
- * an appropriate return value in regs->r3.
- *
- * Return: the (possibly changed) syscall number.
- */
-long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- u32 flags;
-
- flags = read_thread_flags() & (_TIF_SYSCALL_EMU | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
-
- if (flags) {
- int rc = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
-
- if (unlikely(flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)) {
- /*
- * A nonzero return code from
- * ptrace_report_syscall_entry() tells us to prevent
- * the syscall execution, but we are not going to
- * execute it anyway.
- *
- * Returning -1 will skip the syscall execution. We want
- * to avoid clobbering any registers, so we don't goto
- * the skip label below.
- */
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (rc) {
- /*
- * The tracer decided to abort the syscall. Note that
- * the tracer may also just change regs->gpr[0] to an
- * invalid syscall number, that is handled below on the
- * exit path.
- */
- goto skip;
- }
- }
-
- /* Run seccomp after ptrace; allow it to set gpr[3]. */
- if (do_seccomp(regs))
- return -1;
-
- /* Avoid trace and audit when syscall is invalid. */
- if (regs->gpr[0] >= NR_syscalls)
- goto skip;
-
- if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
- trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gpr[0]);
-
- if (!is_32bit_task())
- audit_syscall_entry(regs->gpr[0], regs->gpr[3], regs->gpr[4],
- regs->gpr[5], regs->gpr[6]);
- else
- audit_syscall_entry(regs->gpr[0],
- regs->gpr[3] & 0xffffffff,
- regs->gpr[4] & 0xffffffff,
- regs->gpr[5] & 0xffffffff,
- regs->gpr[6] & 0xffffffff);
-
- /* Return the possibly modified but valid syscall number */
- return regs->gpr[0];
-
-skip:
- /*
- * If we are aborting explicitly, or if the syscall number is
- * now invalid, set the return value to -ENOSYS.
- */
- regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-}
-
-void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- int step;
-
- audit_syscall_exit(regs);
-
- if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
- trace_sys_exit(regs, regs->result);
-
- step = test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP);
- if (step || test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
- ptrace_report_syscall_exit(regs, step);
-}
-
void __init pt_regs_check(void);
/*
--
2.42.0.windows.2
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