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Message-ID: <20240917170407.jxtpb75iru3qg74c@desk>
Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 10:04:07 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 02:08:23PM -0500, David Kaplan wrote:
> The rest of the patches define new "attack vector" command line options
> to make it easier to select appropriate mitigations based on the usage
> of the system. While many users may not be intimately familiar with the
> details of these CPU vulnerabilities, they are likely better able to
> understand the intended usage of their system. As a result, unneeded
> mitigations may be disabled, allowing users to recoup more performance.
How much performance improvement are you seeing with each of the attack
vector?
There aren't many vulnerabilities that only affect a single attack vector.
So, selecting to mitigate single attack vector mitigates a lot more than
that.
We may be able to get better performance improvement by adding vector-based
switches at the mitigation points. And only enable them if user asked for it.
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