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Message-ID: <3c7b27e3-eedc-44c7-a31b-d927214cc9f8@proton.me>
Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 07:45:44 +0000
From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>
To: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@...ll.ch>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>, Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>, Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>, Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>, Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@...sung.com>, Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>, Trevor Gross <tmgross@...ch.edu>, rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] rust: add untrusted data abstraction

On 16.09.24 17:49, Simona Vetter wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 04:49:29PM +0000, Benno Lossin wrote:
>> On 13.09.24 17:33, Simona Vetter wrote:
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 11:26:57AM +0000, Benno Lossin wrote:
>>>>  /// Used to transfer ownership to and from foreign (non-Rust) languages.
>>>> @@ -532,3 +533,248 @@ unsafe impl AsBytes for str {}
>>>>  // does not have any uninitialized portions either.
>>>>  unsafe impl<T: AsBytes> AsBytes for [T] {}
>>>>  unsafe impl<T: AsBytes, const N: usize> AsBytes for [T; N] {}
>>>> +
>>>> +/// Untrusted data of type `T`.
>>>> +///
>>>> +/// When reading data from userspace, hardware or other external untrusted sources, the data must
>>>> +/// be validated before it is used for logic within the kernel. To do so, the [`validate()`]
>>>> +/// function exists and uses the [`Validator`] trait. For raw bytes validation there also is the
>>>> +/// [`validate_bytes()`] function.
>>>> +///
>>>> +///
>>>> +/// [`validate()`]: Self::validate
>>>> +/// [`validate_bytes()`]: Self::validate_bytes
>>>> +#[repr(transparent)]
>>>> +pub struct Untrusted<T: ?Sized>(T);
>>>
>>> I think we could make this a bit more strict and instead of encouraging
>>> people to put all their validation code into a Validator<T>, force
>>> them to. Which means assuming apis wrap all untrusted stuff in
>>> Untrusted<T> reviewers only need to look at validate implementations and
>>> nothing else.
>>>
>>> If I'm not too wrong with my rust I think this would work with slitting
>>> Untrusted<T> into two types:
>>>
>>> - Untrusted<T> is just a box you can't access, and the type returned by
>>>   apis for untrusted data. It doesn't have any of the functions except
>>>   validate and new_untrusted so that you can't get at the data at all.
>>>
>>> - UntrustedUnsafe<T> does have all the accessors needed for validation,
>>>   but you can't construct that outside of this module. Maybe simplest to
>>>   just nest this within the Untrusted<T> box.
>>>
>>> - Untrusted::validate does the unboxing and passes a reference to
>>>   UntrustedUnsafe<T> to Validator::validate, to guarantee that all the
>>>   validation code is in there and nowhere else. Similar for
>>>   validate_bytes.
>>>
>>> Of course people can still bypass this easily, but it gets a bit harder to
>>> do so, and easier for reviewers to verify everything.
>>
>> This is a great idea!
>> I think we should also remove `validate_bytes`, then you really must
>> implement `Validator`. If we figure out later that people need it, we
>> can add it later again. I added it because I thought that implementing
>> `Validator` for something very small might be very annoying, but it
>> seems like you actually want to force people to implement it :)
> 
> See further down, I think there's a real use-case for validate_bytes, or
> something really close to it at least.

Could you point me to it? I wasn't able to find the use-case you are
referring to here.

If I remove the `untrusted()` function, then I would think that I also
should remove the `validate_bytes` function, since you could just do:

    untrusted.validate_bytes(|_| true)

Which would give you access to the untrusted data without validation.
(of course one could also do this in the `Validate` trait, but I feel
like if we have exactly one place where this can happen, it will be a
lot easier to catch. We could even have some tool that looks for
`Validate` implementations that just return `Ok(untrusted)`)

---
Cheers,
Benno

>> I think we should discuss the name `UntrustedUnsafe` though, I don't
>> really like the `Unsafe` although I understand why you used it. What do
>> you think of renaming the current `Untrusted` (and the one that only
>> exposes `validate`) to `Unvalidated` and using `Untrusted` as the
>> parameter for `Validator::validate`?
> 
> Much better, I didn't like my naming either.
> 
>> Alternatively, we could use `Unverified`/`Untrusted`, because
>> unvalidated is not a "real English word". But then I think we also
>> should rename `Validator` to `Verifier` etc.
>>
>>>> +    /// Gives direct access to the underlying untrusted data.
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// Be careful when accessing the data, as it is untrusted and still needs to be verified! To
>>>> +    /// do so use [`validate()`].
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// [`validate()`]: Self::validate
>>>> +    pub fn untrusted(&self) -> &T {
>>>> +        &self.0
>>>> +    }
>>>> +
>>>> +    /// Gives direct access to the underlying untrusted data.
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// Be careful when accessing the data, as it is untrusted and still needs to be verified! To
>>>> +    /// do so use [`validate()`].
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// [`validate()`]: Self::validate
>>>> +    pub fn untrusted_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T {
>>>> +        &mut self.0
>>>> +    }
>>>> +
>>>> +    /// Unwraps the data and removes the untrusted marking.
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// Be careful when accessing the data, as it is untrusted and still needs to be verified! To
>>>> +    /// do so use [`validate()`].
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// [`validate()`]: Self::validate
>>>> +    pub fn into_inner_untrusted(self) -> T
>>>
>>> I don't like the above two since they could be easily and accidentally
>>> abused to leak untrusted data. And at least in your example I think
>>> they're fallout from being a bit too eager with annotating data as
>>> untrusted. The Folio and Mapped itself are just kernel structures, they
>>> better be correct. So I don't think it's useful to annotate those as
>>> untrusted and rely on Deref to also annotate the actual data as untrusted,
>>> because it forces you to peak behind the box a few times.
>>
>> As I wrote in patch 2, I have no idea if I added the `Untrusted<T>` in
>> the correct places, as I don't know folios. I would disagree, that these
>> methods are necessary because of marking the entire folio as untrusted,
>> they are needed to access the data from within the `Validator::validate`
>> function, but with your above suggestion, we can move them to the
>> internal type.
>>
>>> Instead I think we only want to annotate the Folio Deref:
>>>
>>> impl<S> Deref for Mapped<'_, S> {
>>>     type Target = Untrusted<[u8]>;
>>>
>>> Now there will be folios that we trust because they're kernel internal
>>> data and not file cache, so we need more flexibility here. No idea how to
>>> best make that happen, but in either case it's only the Deref data itself
>>> we don't trust, not any of the structures around it. One example would be
>>> gpu page tables. One way to implement this would be to make the Target
>>> type a generic of the folio, or well an associated type of the existing
>>> generics folio paramater:
>>>
>>> pub struct Folio<S: FolioType>
>>>
>>> pub trait FolioType {
>>> 	type Data;
>>> }
>>>
>>> impl<T> FolioType for PageCache<T> {
>>> 	type Data = Untrusted<[u8]>;
>>> }
>>>
>>> And gpu pagetables would use a something like this instead:
>>>
>>> impl FolioType for GpuFolios {
>>> 	type Data = [struct GpuPTE];
>>> }
>>>
>>> All extremely untested.
>>
>> What I would like to avoid is having to do this for every possible data
>> source. Ideally we could just wrap trusted data sources with `Untrusted`
>> and be done with it.
>> If the wrapped type is not plain data, but rather a smart pointer or
>> other abstraction, then only the underlying data is marked untrusted
>> (otherwise how would you even know that the pointer can be used?). So
>> for example one might have an `Untrusted<ARef<[u8]>>`.
> 
> Yeah I think for pure smart pointers this is great, hence why I didn't
> object to your Deref implementation. But if there's an entire
> datastructure around it (like with pagecache) I think we need to sprinkle
> associated types around to make this work.
> 
> What imo breaks annotations like this is if you have a lot of false
> positive cases that force people to jump through hoops and normalize
> having random uncecessary "validate" code all over. That defeats the
> point.
> 
>> What I think we should do instead is make our APIs that return untrusted
>> data just return `Untrusted<Folio>` and implement the following method:
>>
>>     impl Folio {
>>         pub fn read(self: &Untrusted<Self>) -> &Untrusted<[u8]>;
>>     }
>>
>> I think that is the best of both worlds: we don't need to do excessive
>> type shenanigans for every type carrying potentially untrusted data and
>> we get to have methods specific to untrusted data.
>>
>> However, I think implementing this method will be a bit difficult with
>> the `Untrusted`/`Unvalidated` split. Maybe we can have some `pub(crate)`
>> methods on `Unvalidated` to perform some mappings?
> 
> The thing is, folios are just a pile of contig pages, and there's nothing
> in the rules that they only contain untrusted data. Currently in rust code
> we have that's the case, but not in general. So we need that associated
> type.
> 
> But I also think Folio here is special, a lot of the other places where I
> want this annotation it's the case that the data returned is _always_
> untrusted. So we don't need to place associated types all over the
> codebase to make this work, it's just that the rfc example you've picked
> needs it.
> 
> E.g. copy_from_user is _always_ untrusted, not exception. Network packets
> we read are also always untrusted. When you have a device driver and want
> to be robust against evil implementations (external bus like usb or cloud
> virtual hw with confidential compute), then also everything you ever read
> from that device is always untrusted until validated.
> 
> And the neat thing is if we get this right, there's a lot of cases where
> the Untrusted<> wrapper doesn't matter, because we just pass from one
> untrusted to another. E.g. for the write() syscall (or an implemenation of
> that in an fs) we get a Untrusted<[u8]> from Folio and let copy_from_user
> directly write into that. But that only works if the annotations are
> exactly right, not too much, not too little.
> 
> Oh another one we need:
> 
> impl<T: AsBytes> AsBytes for Untrusted<AsBytes>
> 
> Otherwise you can't write untrusted stuff to userspace, which is really no
> issue at all (e.g. networking, where the kernel only parses the headers
> and shovels the data to userspace unchecked).
> 
>>> Now I think there are cases you can't cover with just validate, where you
>>> have multiple input data which needs to be cross-checked to ensure overall
>>> validity. But I think that we can cover that by implementing a Validator
>>> for tuples and making Untrusted a trait so that we can either Accept
>>> Untrusted<(A, B)> or (Untrusted<A>, Untrusted<B>) interchangably when
>>> calling validate().
>>
>> I could imagine us adding conversion functions that can combine
>> untrusted values. Additionally, we should probably add a `Context` type
>> to `Validator` that is an additional parameter.
>>
>>> At least with an hour of theorizing and your one example I couldn't come
>>> up with anything else.
>>
>> Yeah, we need more users of this to know the full way to express this
>> correctly. I would like to avoid huge refactorings in the future.
> 
> I think adding it to the copy_*_user functions we already have in
> upstream, and then asking Alice to rebase binder should be a really solid
> real-world testcase. And I think currently for the things in-flight
> copy*user is going to be the main source of untrusted data anyway, not so
> much page cache folios.
> 
>>>> +impl Untrusted<[u8]> {
>>>> +    /// Validate the given bytes directly.
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// This is a convenience method to not have to implement the [`Validator`] trait to be able to
>>>> +    /// just parse some bytes. If the bytes that you are validating have some structure and/or you
>>>> +    /// will parse it into a `struct` or other rust type, then it is very much recommended to use
>>>> +    /// the [`Validator`] trait and the [`validate()`] function instead.
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// # Examples
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// ```
>>>> +    /// # fn get_untrusted_data() -> &'static Untrusted<[u8]> { &[0; 8] }
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// let data: &Untrusted<[u8]> = get_untrusted_data();
>>>> +    /// let data: Result<&[u8], ()> = data.validate_bytes::<()>(|untrusted| {
>>>> +    ///     if untrusted.len() != 2 {
>>>> +    ///         return Err(());
>>>> +    ///     }
>>>> +    ///     if untrusted[0] & 0xf0 != 0 {
>>>> +    ///         return Err(());
>>>> +    ///     }
>>>> +    ///     if untrusted[1] >= 100 {
>>>> +    ///         return Err(());
>>>> +    ///     }
>>>> +    ///     Ok(())
>>>> +    /// });
>>>> +    /// match data {
>>>> +    ///     Ok(data) => pr_info!("successfully validated the data: {data}"),
>>>> +    ///     Err(()) => pr_info!("read faulty data from hardware!"),
>>>> +    /// }
>>>> +    /// ```
>>>> +    ///
>>>> +    /// [`validate()`]: Self::validate
>>>> +    pub fn validate_bytes<E>(
>>>
>>> I think this is a special case of a somewhat common in-place validation
>>> pattern. For example in in complex syscall or ioctl we need to copy
>>> structures from userspace anyway and doing yet another copy to put them
>>> into a rust structure isn't great, instead we validate in-place. So I
>>> think we need something like
>>>
>>> impl Untrusted<T> {
>>> 	pub fn validate_inplace<E>(
>>> 		&self,
>>> 		validator: impl FnOnce(&T) -> Result<(), E>,
>>> 		) -> Result <&T, E> {
>>> 		...
>>> 	}
>>> }
>>
>> I had thought about in-place validation as well, but I first wanted to
>> get a feel for how to do it, since I felt that in-place might make it
>> significantly more complicated.
>> In your proposal, you give a reference back, but maybe the data started
>> out as a `Box<[u8]>` (or how do you usually copy from userspace?), so it
>> would be better to be able to also handle owned data.
> 
> The code in upstream is just MaybUninit<[u8]>.
> 
>> Also, it might be a good idea to just make the copy to kernel and
>> validate a single step.
> 
> Yeah that'd be a nice helper, but I think conceptually you want it to be
> two steps: Often for efficiency complex structures are linearized into one
> single memory block, so that you can pull it all in with one
> copy_from_user. But validation would need to look at each piece (and it's
> often mixed, not just an array), probably together with Alice's Range
> datatype to make sure we're don't have index confusions.
> 
>>> Eventually we might want a _mut version of this too, because often uapi
>>> extensions means we need to correctly fill out default values for
>>> extensions when being called by old userspace, and that requires
>>> mutability. And it really is often an integral part of input validation.
>>
>> I see, will have to think about how to include this as well.
>>
>>> Also I think we might need an Iterator for Untrusted<I: IntoIterator> so
>>> that we can validate Untrusted<[T]> and things like that with standard map
>>> and collect and do it all inplace.
>>
>> Hmm, so a general iterator for `Unvalidated` might be a bad idea, but
>> for the `Untrusted`, it should be fine.
> 
> Yup that was my thinking too, the idea being that you write a validator
> for a single element, and then let Iterator magic handle things when you
> need to validate an entire array.
> 
>>>> +pub trait Validator {
>>>> +    /// Type of the input data that is untrusted.
>>>> +    type Input: ?Sized;
>>>> +    /// Type of the validated data.
>>>> +    type Output;
>>>
>>> So I think the explicit Output makes sense if you have multiple different
>>> untrusted input that validate to the same trusted structure, but I'm not
>>> sure this makes sense as associated types. Instead I'd go with generics
>>> and somethign like this:
>>>
>>> pub trait Validator<Input: ?Sized> {
>>>     type Err;
>>>
>>>     fn validate(untrusted: &Untrusted<Input>) -> Result<Self, Self::Err>;
>>> }
>>>
>>> That means you can't implement validate for types from other modules
>>> directly but need a newtype (I think at least, not sure). But I think
>>> that's actually a good thing, since often that means you're validating
>>> some generic state plus whatever your own code needs (like the
>>> inode::Params<tarfs::INodeData> in your example), and both pieces need to
>>> be consisted overall and not just individually (otherwise why does the
>>> that other module not do the parsing for you). And so explicitly treating
>>> the validated output as an explicit new type just makes sense to me. Plus
>>> with derive(Deref) it's trivial to unbox after validation.
>>
>> There might be the need to validate the same piece of data with
>> different ways and I am not convinced adding a newtype for every single
>> case is a good way to achieve it.
>> Although it would simplify the `Validator` trait... I will think a bit
>> about this.
> 
> Hm, but unless I misunderstand you already need a random type to attach
> your current trait too? So not worse if we require that for the
> less-common type of multiple ways to validate the same, and simpler for
> the common one.
> 
>>> Cheers, Sima
>>
>> Thanks a lot for taking a look!
> 
> I _really_ want this :-)
> -Sima
> --
> Simona Vetter
> Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
> http://blog.ffwll.ch


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