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Message-ID: <ZvJseVoT7gN_GBG3@google.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 00:38:33 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Jack Allister <jalliste@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@...zon.co.uk>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>, "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
"nh-open-source@...zon.com" <nh-open-source@...zon.com>, "shuah@...nel.org" <shuah@...nel.org>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Process some MMIO-related errors without KVM exit
On Mon, Sep 23, 2024, Jack Allister wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-09-23 at 10:04 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 23, 2024, Ivan Orlov wrote:
> > > Currently, KVM may return a variety of internal errors to VMM when
> > > accessing MMIO, and some of them could be gracefully handled on the
> > > KVM
> > > level instead. Moreover, some of the MMIO-related errors are
> > > handled
> > > differently in VMX in comparison with SVM, which produces certain
> > > inconsistency and should be fixed. This patch series introduces
> > > KVM-level handling for the following situations:
> > >
> > > 1) Guest is accessing MMIO during event delivery: triple fault
> > > instead
> > > of internal error on VMX and infinite loop on SVM
> > >
> > > 2) Guest fetches an instruction from MMIO: inject #UD and resume
> > > guest
> > > execution without internal error
> >
> > No. This is not architectural behavior. It's not even remotely close to
> > architectural behavior. KVM's behavior isn't great, but making up _guest
> > visible_ behavior is not going to happen.
>
> Is this a no to the whole series or from the cover letter?
The whole series.
> For patch 1 we have observed that if a guest has incorrectly set it's
> IDT base to point inside of an MMIO region it will result in a triple
> fault (bare metal Cascake Lake Intel).
The triple fault occurs because the MMIO read returns garbage, e.g. because it
gets back master abort semantics.
> Yes a sane operating system is not really going to be doing setting it's IDT
> or GDT base to point into an MMIO region, but we've seen occurrences.
Sure, but that doesn't make it architecturally correct to synthesize arbitrary
faults.
> Normally when other external things have gone horribly wrong.
>
> Ivan can clarify as to what's been seen on AMD platforms regarding the
> infinite loop for patch one.
So it sounds like what you really want to do is not put the vCPU into an infinite
loop. Have you tried kvm/next or kvm-x86/next, which has fixes for infinite
loops on TDP faults? Specifically, these commits:
98a69b96caca3e07aff57ca91fd7cc3a3853871a KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on MMIO cache hit when emulating write-protected gfn
d859b16161c81ee929b7b02a85227b8e3250bc97 KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
6b3dcabc10911711eba15816d808e2a18f130406 KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version
2876624e1adcd9a3a3ffa8c4fe3bf8dbba969d95 KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure()
4df685664bed04794ad72b58d8af1fa4fcc60261 KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure
dabc4ff70c35756bc107bc5d035d0f0746396a9a KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path
19ab2c8be070160be70a88027b3b93106fef7b89 KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn
620525739521376a65a690df899e1596d56791f8 KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed emulation
b299c273c06f005976cdc1b9e9299d492527607e KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
29e495bdf847ac6ad0e0d03e5db39a3ed9f12858 KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when unprotecting
b7e948898e772ac900950c0dac4ca90e905cd0c0 KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect an INVALID_GPA
2df354e37c1398a85bb43cbbf1f913eb3f91d035 KVM: x86: Fold retry_instruction() into x86_emulate_instruction()
41e6e367d576ce1801dc5c2b106e14cde35e3c80 KVM: x86: Move EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to x86_emulate_instruction()
dfaae8447c53819749cf3ba10ce24d3c609752e3 KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
01dd4d319207c4cfd51a1c9a1812909e944d8c86 KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path
9c19129e535bfff85bdfcb5a804e19e5aae935b2 KVM: x86: Store gpa as gpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for retry
019f3f84a40c88b68ca4d455306b92c20733e784 KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip
c1edcc41c3603c65f34000ae031a20971f4e56f9 KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is zapped
2fb2b7877b3a4cac4de070ef92437b38f13559b0 KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
989a84c93f592e6b288fb3b96d2eeec827d75bef KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
4ececec19a0914873634ad69bbaca5557c33e855 KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper
> This was also tested on bare metal hardware. Injection of the #UD within
> patch 2 may be debatable but I believe Ivan has some more data from
> experiments backing this up.
Heh, it's not debatable. Fetching from MMIO is perfectly legal. Again, any #UD
you see on bare metal is all but guaranteed to be due to fetching garbage.
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