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Message-ID: <CAFULd4ZNwfPZO-yDjrtT2ANV509HeeYgR80b9AFachaVW5zqrg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 20:32:50 +0200
From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@...il.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dennis Zhou <dennis@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, Keith Packard <keithp@...thp.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>, Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-sparse@...r.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 05/28] x86: Define the stack protector guard symbol explicitly
On Wed, Sep 25, 2024 at 5:02 PM Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
>
> Specify the guard symbol for the stack cookie explicitly, rather than
> positioning it exactly 40 bytes into the per-CPU area. Doing so removes
> the need for the per-CPU region to be absolute rather than relative to
> the placement of the per-CPU template region in the kernel image, and
> this allows the special handling for absolute per-CPU symbols to be
> removed entirely.
>
> This is a worthwhile cleanup in itself, but it is also a prerequisite
> for PIE codegen and PIE linking, which can replace our bespoke and
> rather clunky runtime relocation handling.
I would like to point out a series that converted the stack protector
guard symbol to a normal percpu variable [1], so there was no need to
assume anything about the location of the guard symbol.
[1] "[PATCH v4 00/16] x86-64: Stack protector and percpu improvements"
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240322165233.71698-1-brgerst@gmail.com/
Uros.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/Makefile | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 11 +++--------
> arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 4 ----
> tools/perf/util/annotate.c | 4 ++--
> 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
> index 6b3fe6e2aadd..b78b7623a4a9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
> @@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ else
> KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Cno-redzone=y
> KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Ccode-model=kernel
>
> + ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
> + KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard-symbol=fixed_percpu_data
> + endif
> +
> # Don't emit relaxable GOTPCREL relocations
> KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL += -Wa,-mrelax-relocations=no
> KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL += -Wa,-mrelax-relocations=no
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> index 14d72727d7ee..3ed0e8ec973f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
> #ifndef _ASM_X86_INIT_H
> #define _ASM_X86_INIT_H
>
> -#define __head __section(".head.text")
> +#define __head __section(".head.text") __no_stack_protector
>
> struct x86_mapping_info {
> void *(*alloc_pgt_page)(void *); /* allocate buf for page table */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 4a686f0e5dbf..56bc36116814 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -402,14 +402,9 @@ struct irq_stack {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> struct fixed_percpu_data {
> /*
> - * GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40. Since the
> - * irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom
> - * 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary.
> - *
> - * Once we are willing to require -mstack-protector-guard-symbol=
> - * support for x86_64 stackprotector, we can get rid of this.
> + * Since the irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, the bottom 8 bytes of
> + * the irq stack are reserved for the canary.
> */
> - char gs_base[40];
> unsigned long stack_canary;
> };
>
> @@ -418,7 +413,7 @@ DECLARE_INIT_PER_CPU(fixed_percpu_data);
>
> static inline unsigned long cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(int cpu)
> {
> - return (unsigned long)per_cpu(fixed_percpu_data.gs_base, cpu);
> + return (unsigned long)&per_cpu(fixed_percpu_data, cpu);
> }
>
> extern asmlinkage void entry_SYSCALL32_ignore(void);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> index 00473a650f51..d1dcd22a0a4c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> @@ -51,10 +51,6 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
> {
> unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fixed_percpu_data, stack_canary) != 40);
> -#endif
> -
> current->stack_canary = canary;
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> this_cpu_write(fixed_percpu_data.stack_canary, canary);
> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/annotate.c b/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
> index 37ce43c4eb8f..7ecfedf5edb9 100644
> --- a/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
> +++ b/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
> @@ -2485,10 +2485,10 @@ static bool is_stack_operation(struct arch *arch, struct disasm_line *dl)
>
> static bool is_stack_canary(struct arch *arch, struct annotated_op_loc *loc)
> {
> - /* On x86_64, %gs:40 is used for stack canary */
> + /* On x86_64, %gs:0 is used for stack canary */
> if (arch__is(arch, "x86")) {
> if (loc->segment == INSN_SEG_X86_GS && loc->imm &&
> - loc->offset == 40)
> + loc->offset == 0)
> return true;
> }
>
> --
> 2.46.0.792.g87dc391469-goog
>
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