linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 048/139] proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes

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Message-ID: <871q16ad0w.fsf@gentoo.mail-host-address-is-not-set>
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 14:07:59 +0300
From: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org, Doug Anderson
 <dianders@...omium.org>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Jann Horn
 <jannh@...gle.com>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel
 <ardb@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Linus Torvalds
 <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, corbet@....net, paul@...l-moore.com,
 jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, thuth@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
 tglx@...utronix.de, jpoimboe@...nel.org, paulmck@...nel.org,
 tony@...mide.com, xiongwei.song@...driver.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
 oleg@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
 linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 048/139] proc: add config & param to block
 forcing mem writes

On Wed, 25 Sep 2024, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 25, 2024 at 08:07:48AM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote: 
>> From: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>  [ Upstream 
>> commit 41e8149c8892ed1962bd15350b3c3e6e90cba7f4 ]  This adds a 
>> Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing the FOLL_FORCE 
>> flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because it can be abused. 
> 
> And this is not a mount option why? 

Hello and thanks for asking!

The only reason is nobody asked for it yet. :)

We need to be careful how we do this, so the restriction is still 
enabled when remounting, otherwise I don't see any impediment, 
provided we can find a way to make it clean and safe.
 
I am travelling these weeks (All Systems GO conf) and have a lot 
going on, so please feel free to send a patch and I'll review it 
ASAP, otherwise I'll try to come up with something by end of 
October.

Adrian