linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed feature

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ZvrMBs-eScleFMOT@google.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 09:04:22 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, 
	david.kaplan@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without
 HvInUseWrAllowed feature

On Mon, Sep 30, 2024, Suravee Suthikulpanit wrote:
> On SNP-enabled system, VMRUN marks AVIC Backing Page as in-use while
> the guest is running for both secure and non-secure guest. This causes
> any attempts to modify the RMP entries for the backing page to result in
> FAIL_INUSE response. This is to ensure that the AVIC backing page is not
> maliciously assigned to an SNP guest while the unencrypted guest is active.
> 
> Currently, an attempt to run AVIC guest would result in the following error:
> 
>     BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff3a442e549cc270
>     #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
>     #PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation
>     PGD b6ee01067 P4D b6ee02067 PUD 10096d063 PMD 11c540063 PTE 80000001149cc163
>     SEV-SNP: PFN 0x1149cc unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x114800 - 0x114a00]
>     ...

This should be "fixed" by commit 75253db41a46 ("KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA
and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe"), no?

> Newer AMD system is enhanced to allow hypervisor to modify RMP entries of
> the backing page for non-secure guest on SNP-enabled system. This
> enhancement is available when the CPUID Fn8000_001F_EAX bit 30 is set
> (HvInUseWrAllowed) See the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual (APM)
> Volume 2 for detail. (https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/
> processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf)
> 
> Therefore, add logic to check the new CPUID bit before enabling AVIC
> on SNP-enabled system.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c            | 6 ++++++
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index dd4682857c12..921b6de80e24 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -448,6 +448,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* "debug_swap" AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM		(19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED	(19*32+30) /* Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages allowed */
>  
>  /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
> index 4b74ea91f4e6..42f2caf17d6a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
> @@ -1199,6 +1199,12 @@ bool avic_hardware_setup(void)
>  		return false;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
> +	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED)) {
> +		pr_warn("AVIC disabled: missing HvInUseWrAllowed on SNP-enabled system");
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVIC)) {
>  		pr_info("AVIC enabled\n");
>  	} else if (force_avic) {
> -- 
> 2.34.1
>