linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ALSA: silence integer wrapping warning

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Message-ID: <22ea267f-2326-4128-a182-a4e90d4cfb68@perex.cz>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 09:35:25 +0200
From: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@...ex.cz>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.com>, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
 Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@...amocchi.jp>, linux-sound@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ALSA: silence integer wrapping warning

On 30. 09. 24 9:19, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> This patch doesn't change runtime at all, it's just for kernel hardening.
> 
> The "count" here comes from the user and on 32bit systems, it leads to
> integer wrapping when we pass it to compute_user_elem_size():
> 
> 	alloc_size = compute_user_elem_size(private_size, count);
> 
> However, the integer over is harmless because later "count" is checked
> when we pass it to snd_ctl_new():
> 
> 	err = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, count, access, file);
> 
> These days as part of kernel hardening we're trying to avoid integer
> overflows when they affect size_t type.  So to avoid the integer overflow
> copy the check from snd_ctl_new() and do it at the start of the
> snd_ctl_elem_add() function as well.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
> ---
> I'm going to write a blog about this which explains the kernel hardening
> proposal in more detail.
> 
> The problem is that integer overflows are really hard to analyze
> because the integer overflow itself is harmless.  The harmful thing comes
> later.  Not only are integer overflows harmless, but many of them are
> done deliberately.
> 
> So what we're doing is we're saying that size_t types should not overflow.
> This eliminates many deliberate integer overflows handling time values for
> example.  We're also ignoring deliberate idiomatic integer overflows such
> as if (a + b < a) {.
> 
> We're going to detect these integer overflows using static analysis and at
> runtime using UBSan and Syzbot.
> 
> The other thing, actually, is the we're planning to only work on 64bit
> systems for now so if you want to ignore this patch then that's fine.  There
> are a lot more (like 10x more) integer overflows on 32bit systems but most
> people are on 64bit.  So it's less work and more impact to focus on 64bit
> at first.
> 
>   sound/core/control.c | 2 ++
>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
> index 4f55f64c42e1..82b9d14f4ee3 100644
> --- a/sound/core/control.c
> +++ b/sound/core/control.c
> @@ -1641,6 +1641,8 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
>   	count = info->owner;
>   	if (count == 0)
>   		count = 1;
> +	if (count > MAX_CONTROL_COUNT)
> +		return -EINVAL;
>   
>   	/* Arrange access permissions if needed. */
>   	access = info->access;

It looks safe and this check is already in snd_ctl_new(). Perhaps, it may be 
clever to add a direct comment to the code about purpose of this extra 
(double) check.

Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@...ex.cz>


				Jaroslav

-- 
Jaroslav Kysela <perex@...ex.cz>
Linux Sound Maintainer; ALSA Project; Red Hat, Inc.