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Message-ID: <dd62c167-f8d5-4c48-b92e-9efde6a61d7e@lucifer.local>
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2024 19:26:14 +0100
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
"James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Chris Zankel <chris@...kel.net>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page
mechanism
On Fri, Oct 04, 2024 at 11:17:13AM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> Hi Lorenzo,
>
> Please add me to this series, I 'm interested in everything related to
> mseal :-), thanks.
Hi Jeff, more than happy to cc you on this going forward :)
The only change to mseal is a trivial change because the poison operation
discards, wasn't intentional, but apologies, I should have cc'd you
regardless! Will do so on any such interaction with mseal moving forward.
>
> I also added Kees into the cc, since mseal is a security feature.
Sure no problem happy to keep Kees cc-d too (Kees - ping me if you'd prefer
not :>), however a note on this - guard pages _themselves_ are emphatically
NOT a security feature, and make no guarantees on this front, but rather
are a convenience/effiency thing.
Obviously however I am adding madvise() functionality here, and all such
functionality must take into account whether or not they are discard
operations as to ensure mseal semantics are obeyed - see below for my
argument as to why I feel the poison operation falls under this.
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 5:52 AM Lorenzo Stoakes
> <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
> >
> > Implement a new lightweight guard page feature, that is regions of userland
> > virtual memory that, when accessed, cause a fatal signal to arise.
> >
> > Currently users must establish PROT_NONE ranges to achieve this.
> >
> > However this is very costly memory-wise - we need a VMA for each and every
> > one of these regions AND they become unmergeable with surrounding VMAs.
> >
> > In addition repeated mmap() calls require repeated kernel context switches
> > and contention of the mmap lock to install these ranges, potentially also
> > having to unmap memory if installed over existing ranges.
> >
> > The lightweight guard approach eliminates the VMA cost altogether - rather
> > than establishing a PROT_NONE VMA, it operates at the level of page table
> > entries - poisoning PTEs such that accesses to them cause a fault followed
> > by a SIGSGEV signal being raised.
> >
> > This is achieved through the PTE marker mechanism, which a previous commit
> > in this series extended to permit this to be done, installed via the
> > generic page walking logic, also extended by a prior commit for this
> > purpose.
> >
> > These poison ranges are established with MADV_GUARD_POISON, and if the
> > range in which they are installed contain any existing mappings, they will
> > be zapped, i.e. free the range and unmap memory (thus mimicking the
> > behaviour of MADV_DONTNEED in this respect).
> >
> > Any existing poison entries will be left untouched. There is no nesting of
> > poisoned pages.
> >
> > Poisoned ranges are NOT cleared by MADV_DONTNEED, as this would be rather
> > unexpected behaviour, but are cleared on process teardown or unmapping of
> > memory ranges.
> >
> > Ranges can have the poison property removed by MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON -
> > 'remedying' the poisoning. The ranges over which this is applied, should
> > they contain non-poison entries, will be untouched, only poison entries
> > will be cleared.
> >
> > We permit this operation on anonymous memory only, and only VMAs which are
> > non-special, non-huge and not mlock()'d (if we permitted this we'd have to
> > drop locked pages which would be rather counterintuitive).
> >
> > The poisoning of the range must be performed under mmap write lock as we
> > have to install an anon_vma to ensure correct behaviour on fork.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
> > Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> > Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
> > ---
> > arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 +
> > mm/madvise.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > mm/mprotect.c | 3 +-
> > mm/mseal.c | 1 +
> > 8 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > index 763929e814e9..71e13f27742d 100644
> > --- a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > +++ b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
> >
> > #define MADV_COLLAPSE 25 /* Synchronous hugepage collapse */
> >
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_POISON 102 /* fatal signal on access to range */
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON 103 /* revoke guard poisoning */
> > +
> > /* compatibility flags */
> > #define MAP_FILE 0
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > index 9c48d9a21aa0..1a2222322f77 100644
> > --- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > +++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@
> >
> > #define MADV_COLLAPSE 25 /* Synchronous hugepage collapse */
> >
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_POISON 102 /* fatal signal on access to range */
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON 103 /* revoke guard poisoning */
> > +
> > /* compatibility flags */
> > #define MAP_FILE 0
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > index 68c44f99bc93..380905522397 100644
> > --- a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > +++ b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@
> > #define MADV_HWPOISON 100 /* poison a page for testing */
> > #define MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE 101 /* soft offline page for testing */
> >
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_POISON 102 /* fatal signal on access to range */
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON 103 /* revoke guard poisoning */
> > +
> > /* compatibility flags */
> > #define MAP_FILE 0
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > index 1ff0c858544f..e8d5affceb28 100644
> > --- a/arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > +++ b/arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> > @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@
> >
> > #define MADV_COLLAPSE 25 /* Synchronous hugepage collapse */
> >
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_POISON 102 /* fatal signal on access to range */
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON 103 /* revoke guard poisoning */
> > +
> > /* compatibility flags */
> > #define MAP_FILE 0
> >
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> > index 6ce1f1ceb432..5dfd3d442de4 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
> > @@ -79,6 +79,9 @@
> >
> > #define MADV_COLLAPSE 25 /* Synchronous hugepage collapse */
> >
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_POISON 102 /* fatal signal on access to range */
> > +#define MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON 103 /* revoke guard poisoning */
> > +
> > /* compatibility flags */
> > #define MAP_FILE 0
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
> > index e871a72a6c32..7216e10723ae 100644
> > --- a/mm/madvise.c
> > +++ b/mm/madvise.c
> > @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int madvise_need_mmap_write(int behavior)
> > case MADV_POPULATE_READ:
> > case MADV_POPULATE_WRITE:
> > case MADV_COLLAPSE:
> > + case MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON: /* Only poisoning needs a write lock. */
> > return 0;
> > default:
> > /* be safe, default to 1. list exceptions explicitly */
> > @@ -1017,6 +1018,157 @@ static long madvise_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > return error;
> > }
> >
> > +static bool is_valid_guard_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool allow_locked)
> > +{
> > + vm_flags_t disallowed = VM_SPECIAL | VM_HUGETLB;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * A user could lock after poisoning but that's fine, as they'd not be
> > + * able to fault in. The issue arises when we try to zap existing locked
> > + * VMAs. We don't want to do that.
> > + */
> > + if (!allow_locked)
> > + disallowed |= VM_LOCKED;
> > +
> > + if (!vma_is_anonymous(vma))
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYWRITE | disallowed)) != VM_MAYWRITE)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int guard_poison_install_pte(unsigned long addr, unsigned long next,
> > + pte_t *ptep, struct mm_walk *walk)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long *num_installed = (unsigned long *)walk->private;
> > +
> > + (*num_installed)++;
> > + /* Simply install a PTE marker, this causes segfault on access. */
> > + *ptep = make_pte_marker(PTE_MARKER_GUARD);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static bool is_guard_pte_marker(pte_t ptent)
> > +{
> > + return is_pte_marker(ptent) &&
> > + is_guard_swp_entry(pte_to_swp_entry(ptent));
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int guard_poison_pte_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
> > + unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> > +{
> > + pte_t ptent = ptep_get(pte);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If not a guard marker, simply abort the operation. We return a value
> > + * > 0 indicating a non-error abort.
> > + */
> > + return !is_guard_pte_marker(ptent);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct mm_walk_ops guard_poison_walk_ops = {
> > + .install_pte = guard_poison_install_pte,
> > + .pte_entry = guard_poison_pte_entry,
> > + /* We might need to install an anon_vma. */
> > + .walk_lock = PGWALK_WRLOCK,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static long madvise_guard_poison(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > + struct vm_area_struct **prev,
> > + unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > + long err;
> > + bool retried = false;
> > +
> > + *prev = vma;
> > + if (!is_valid_guard_vma(vma, /* allow_locked = */false))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Optimistically try to install the guard poison pages first. If any
> > + * non-guard pages are encountered, give up and zap the range before
> > + * trying again.
> > + */
> > + while (true) {
> > + unsigned long num_installed = 0;
> > +
> > + /* Returns < 0 on error, == 0 if success, > 0 if zap needed. */
> > + err = walk_page_range_mm(vma->vm_mm, start, end,
> > + &guard_poison_walk_ops,
> > + &num_installed);
> > + /*
> > + * If we install poison markers, then the range is no longer
> > + * empty from a page table perspective and therefore it's
> > + * appropriate to have an anon_vma.
> > + *
> > + * This ensures that on fork, we copy page tables correctly.
> > + */
> > + if (err >= 0 && num_installed > 0) {
> > + int err_anon = anon_vma_prepare(vma);
> > +
> > + if (err_anon)
> > + err = err_anon;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (err <= 0)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + if (!retried)
> > + /*
> > + * OK some of the range have non-guard pages mapped, zap
> > + * them. This leaves existing guard pages in place.
> > + */
> > + zap_page_range_single(vma, start, end - start, NULL);
> > + else
> > + /*
> > + * If we reach here, then there is a racing fault that
> > + * has populated the PTE after we zapped. Give up and
> > + * let the user know to try again.
> > + */
> > + return -EAGAIN;
> > +
> > + retried = true;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int guard_unpoison_pte_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
> > + unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> > +{
> > + pte_t ptent = ptep_get(pte);
> > +
> > + if (is_guard_pte_marker(ptent)) {
> > + /* Simply clear the PTE marker. */
> > + pte_clear_not_present_full(walk->mm, addr, pte, true);
> > + update_mmu_cache(walk->vma, addr, pte);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct mm_walk_ops guard_unpoison_walk_ops = {
> > + .pte_entry = guard_unpoison_pte_entry,
> > + .walk_lock = PGWALK_RDLOCK,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static long madvise_guard_unpoison(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > + struct vm_area_struct **prev,
> > + unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > + *prev = vma;
> > + /*
> > + * We're ok with unpoisoning mlock()'d ranges, as this is a
> > + * non-destructive action.
> > + */
> > + if (!is_valid_guard_vma(vma, /* allow_locked = */true))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + return walk_page_range(vma->vm_mm, start, end,
> > + &guard_unpoison_walk_ops, NULL);
> > +}
> > +
> > /*
> > * Apply an madvise behavior to a region of a vma. madvise_update_vma
> > * will handle splitting a vm area into separate areas, each area with its own
> > @@ -1098,6 +1250,10 @@ static int madvise_vma_behavior(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > break;
> > case MADV_COLLAPSE:
> > return madvise_collapse(vma, prev, start, end);
> > + case MADV_GUARD_POISON:
> > + return madvise_guard_poison(vma, prev, start, end);
> > + case MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON:
> > + return madvise_guard_unpoison(vma, prev, start, end);
> > }
> >
> > anon_name = anon_vma_name(vma);
> > @@ -1197,6 +1353,8 @@ madvise_behavior_valid(int behavior)
> > case MADV_DODUMP:
> > case MADV_WIPEONFORK:
> > case MADV_KEEPONFORK:
> > + case MADV_GUARD_POISON:
> > + case MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON:
> > #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
> > case MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE:
> > case MADV_HWPOISON:
> > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> > index 0c5d6d06107d..d0e3ebfadef8 100644
> > --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> > @@ -236,7 +236,8 @@ static long change_pte_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
> > } else if (is_pte_marker_entry(entry)) {
> > /*
> > * Ignore error swap entries unconditionally,
> > - * because any access should sigbus anyway.
> > + * because any access should sigbus/sigsegv
> > + * anyway.
> > */
> > if (is_poisoned_swp_entry(entry))
> > continue;
> > diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
> > index ece977bd21e1..21bf5534bcf5 100644
> > --- a/mm/mseal.c
> > +++ b/mm/mseal.c
> > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior)
> > case MADV_REMOVE:
> > case MADV_DONTFORK:
> > case MADV_WIPEONFORK:
> > + case MADV_GUARD_POISON:
>
> Can you please describe the rationale to add this to the existing
> mseal's semantic ?
>
> I didn't not find any description from the cover letter or this
> patch's description, hence asking.
Sure, this is because when you guard-poison ranges that have existing
mappings, it zaps them, which performs basically the exact same operation
as MADV_DONTNEED, and obviously discards any underlying data in doing so.
As a result, I felt it was correct to add this operation to the list of
discard operations from the perspective of mseal.
>
> Thanks
> -Jeff
>
> > return true;
> > }
> >
> > --
> > 2.46.2
> >
> >
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