linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/3] mm/bpf: Add bpf_get_kmem

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Message-ID: <ZwBdS86yBtOWy3iD@google.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2024 21:25:31 +0000
From: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>
To: Song Liu <song@...nel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/3] mm/bpf: Add bpf_get_kmem_cache() kfunc

On Fri, Oct 04, 2024 at 01:10:58PM -0700, Song Liu wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 2, 2024 at 11:10 AM Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > The bpf_get_kmem_cache() is to get a slab cache information from a
> > virtual address like virt_to_cache().  If the address is a pointer
> > to a slab object, it'd return a valid kmem_cache pointer, otherwise
> > NULL is returned.
> >
> > It doesn't grab a reference count of the kmem_cache so the caller is
> > responsible to manage the access.  The intended use case for now is to
> > symbolize locks in slab objects from the lock contention tracepoints.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
> > Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev> (mm/*)
> > Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz> #mm/slab
> > Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
> > ---
> >  kernel/bpf/helpers.c |  1 +
> >  mm/slab_common.c     | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > index 4053f279ed4cc7ab..3709fb14288105c6 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > @@ -3090,6 +3090,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_new, KF_ITER_NEW)
> >  BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
> >  BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY)
> >  BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_str, KF_SLEEPABLE)
> > +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_kmem_cache, KF_RET_NULL)
> >  BTF_KFUNCS_END(common_btf_ids)
> >
> >  static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set common_kfunc_set = {
> > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> > index 7443244656150325..5484e1cd812f698e 100644
> > --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> > @@ -1322,6 +1322,25 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> > +#include <linux/btf.h>
> > +
> > +__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
> > +
> > +__bpf_kfunc struct kmem_cache *bpf_get_kmem_cache(u64 addr)
> > +{
> > +       struct slab *slab;
> > +
> > +       if (!virt_addr_valid(addr))
> > +               return NULL;
> > +
> > +       slab = virt_to_slab((void *)(long)addr);
> > +       return slab ? slab->slab_cache : NULL;
> > +}
> 
> Do we need to hold a refcount to the slab_cache? Given
> we make this kfunc available everywhere, including
> sleepable contexts, I think it is necessary.

It's a really good question.

If the callee somehow owns the slab object, as in the example
provided in the series (current task), it's not necessarily.

If a user can pass a random address, you're right, we need to
grab the slab_cache's refcnt. But then we also can't guarantee
that the object still belongs to the same slab_cache, the
function becomes racy by the definition.