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Message-ID: <24700097-561f-4b81-a45c-e4f7b4b9b853@infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2024 16:42:21 -0700
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
To: jeffxu@...omium.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, keescook@...omium.org,
jannh@...gle.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Hi Jeff,
On 10/4/24 9:31 AM, jeffxu@...omium.org wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
>
> Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++
> arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++-
> fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
> mm/mmap.c | 1 +
> security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++
> 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 28e685f53bd1..e289fbb5d676 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -51,6 +51,32 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
>
> endchoice
>
> +choice
> + prompt "Seal system mappings"
> + default SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER
> + help
> + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and
> + vsyscall.
> + Note: kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings overwrite this.
overwrites
> +
> +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER
> + bool "Traditional behavior - not sealed"
> + help
> + Do not seal system mappings.
> + This is default.
> +
> +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS
> + bool "Always seal system mappings"
> + depends on 64BIT
> + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> + help
> + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and
> + vsyscall.
> + Note: CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore,
> + and remap will fail if the mapping is sealed, therefore
> + !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency.
> +endchoice
> +
> config SECURITY
> bool "Enable different security models"
> depends on SYSFS
--
~Randy
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