linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 1/7] mseal: expose interface to seal / unseal user memory ranges

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Message-ID: <20241008203148.71580-1-faresx@amazon.de>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 20:31:48 +0000
From: Fares Mehanna <faresx@...zon.de>
To: <jeffxu@...omium.org>
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/7] mseal: expose interface to seal / unseal user memory ranges

Hi Jeff,

> Hi Fares,
> 
> Please add me to this series and I'm interested in everything related
> to mseal :-)
> 
> I also added Kees, since mseal is a security feature, and kees is CCed
> on security matters.

Thank you for taking the time to take a look! Sure I will add you both in future
RFCs about this feature.

> On Wed, Sep 25, 2024 at 8:25 AM Fares Mehanna <faresx@...zon.de> wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > Thanks for taking a look and apologies for my delayed response.
> >
> > > It is not clear from the change log above or the cover letter as to why
> > > you need to go this route instead of using the mmap lock.
> >
> > In the current form of the patches I use memfd_secret() to allocate the pages
> > and remove them from kernel linear address. [1]
> >
> > This allocate pages, map them in user virtual addresses and track them in a VMA.
> >
> > Before flipping the permissions on those pages to be used by the kernel, I need
> > to make sure that those virtual addresses and this VMA is off-limits to the
> > owning process.
> >
> > memfd_secret() pages are locked by default, so they won't swap out. I need to
> > seal the VMA to make sure the owner process can't unmap/remap/... or change the
> > protection of this VMA.
> >
> > So before changing the permissions on the secret pages, I make sure the pages
> > are faulted in, locked and sealed. So userspace can't influence this mapping.
> >
> > > We can't use the mseal feature for this; it is supposed to be a one way
> > > transition.
> >
> > For this approach, I need the unseal operation when releasing the memory range.
> >
> > The kernel can be done with the secret pages in one of two scenarios:
> > 1. During lifecycle of the process.
> > 2. When the process terminates.
> >
> > For the first case, I need to unmap the VMA so it can be reused by the owning
> > process later, so I need the unseal operation. For the second case however we
> > don't need that since the process mm is already destructed or just about to be
> > destructed anyway, regardless of sealed/unsealed VMAs. [1]
> >
> > I didn't expose the unseal operation to userspace.
> >
> In general, we should avoid having do_unseal, even though the
> operation is restricted to the kernel itself.
> 
> However, from what you have described, without looking at your code,
> the case is closer to mseal, except that you need to unmap it within
> the kernel code.
> 
> For this, there might be two options that I can think of now, post
> here for discussion:
> 
> 1> Add a new flag in vm_flags, to allow unmap while sealed. However,
> this will not prevent user space from unmap the area.
> 
> 2> pass a flag in do_vmi_align_munmap() to skip sealing checks for
> your particular call. The do_vmi_align_munmap() already has a flag
> such as unlock.
> 
> will the above work for your case ? or I  miss-understood the requirement.

Yeah the second approach is exactly what I'm looking for, just to unmap the VMA
while being sealed to free resources. But I'm not sure how complicated it would
be to use.

But I got a negative feedback about the whole approach of using user vaddr and
VMAs to track kernel secret allocations. Even if I can to keep the VMA off-limits
to the owning process and possible improvement to hide the actual location of
the secret memory.

We're still thinking of a better approach, but if we went back to the first
approach of using separate PGD in kernel space I wouldn't be messing with VMAs
or sealing.

Thanks!
Fares.

> Thanks
> -Jeff



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