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Message-ID: <316dadcb-b199-4b94-8d07-94b40bf534df@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 09:50:14 +0200
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, willy@...radead.org, hughd@...gle.com,
 lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com, joel@...lfernandes.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/mremap: Fix move_normal_pmd/retract_page_tables race

On 07.10.24 23:42, Jann Horn wrote:
> In mremap(), move_page_tables() looks at the type of the PMD entry and the
> specified address range to figure out by which method the next chunk of
> page table entries should be moved.
> At that point, the mmap_lock is held in write mode, but no rmap locks are
> held yet. For PMD entries that point to page tables and are fully covered
> by the source address range, move_pgt_entry(NORMAL_PMD, ...) is called,
> which first takes rmap locks, then does move_normal_pmd().
> move_normal_pmd() takes the necessary page table locks at source and
> destination, then moves an entire page table from the source to the
> destination.
> 
> The problem is: The rmap locks, which protect against concurrent page table
> removal by retract_page_tables() in the THP code, are only taken after the
> PMD entry has been read and it has been decided how to move it.
> So we can race as follows (with two processes that have mappings of the
> same tmpfs file that is stored on a tmpfs mount with huge=advise); note
> that process A accesses page tables through the MM while process B does it
> through the file rmap:
> 
> 
> process A                      process B
> =========                      =========
> mremap
>    mremap_to
>      move_vma
>        move_page_tables
>          get_old_pmd
>          alloc_new_pmd
>                        *** PREEMPT ***
>                                 madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE)
>                                   do_madvise
>                                     madvise_walk_vmas
>                                       madvise_vma_behavior
>                                         madvise_collapse
>                                           hpage_collapse_scan_file
>                                             collapse_file
>                                               retract_page_tables
>                                                 i_mmap_lock_read(mapping)
>                                                 pmdp_collapse_flush
>                                                 i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping)
>          move_pgt_entry(NORMAL_PMD, ...)
>            take_rmap_locks
>            move_normal_pmd
>            drop_rmap_locks
> 
> When this happens, move_normal_pmd() can end up creating bogus PMD entries
> in the line `pmd_populate(mm, new_pmd, pmd_pgtable(pmd))`.
> The effect depends on arch-specific and machine-specific details; on x86,
> you can end up with physical page 0 mapped as a page table, which is likely
> exploitable for user->kernel privilege escalation.
> 
> 
> Fix the race by letting process B recheck that the PMD still points to a
> page table after the rmap locks have been taken. Otherwise, we bail and let
> the caller fall back to the PTE-level copying path, which will then bail
> immediately at the pmd_none() check.
> 
> Bug reachability: Reaching this bug requires that you can create shmem/file
> THP mappings - anonymous THP uses different code that doesn't zap stuff
> under rmap locks. File THP is gated on an experimental config flag
> (CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS), so on normal distro kernels you need shmem
> THP to hit this bug. As far as I know, getting shmem THP normally requires
> that you can mount your own tmpfs with the right mount flags, which would
> require creating your own user+mount namespace; though I don't know if some
> distros maybe enable shmem THP by default or something like that.
> 
> Bug impact: This issue can likely be used for user->kernel privilege
> escalation when it is reachable.
> 
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Fixes: 1d65b771bc08 ("mm/khugepaged: retract_page_tables() without mmap or vma lock")
> Closes: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/371047675
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> ---
> @David: please confirm we can add your Signed-off-by to this patch after
> the Co-developed-by.

Sure, thanks for sending this out!

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb


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