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Message-ID: <20241009.205103-sudsy.thunder.enamel.kennel-kyrq7lTfmNRZ@cyphar.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 07:52:20 +1100
From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
To: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@...il.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	christian@...uner.io, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, oleg@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9] pidfd: add ioctl to retrieve pid info

On 2024-10-08, Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@...il.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 8 Oct 2024 at 14:06, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 08, 2024 at 01:18:20PM GMT, luca.boccassi@...il.com wrote:
> > > From: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@...il.com>
> > >
> > > A common pattern when using pid fds is having to get information
> > > about the process, which currently requires /proc being mounted,
> > > resolving the fd to a pid, and then do manual string parsing of
> > > /proc/N/status and friends. This needs to be reimplemented over
> > > and over in all userspace projects (e.g.: I have reimplemented
> > > resolving in systemd, dbus, dbus-daemon, polkit so far), and
> > > requires additional care in checking that the fd is still valid
> > > after having parsed the data, to avoid races.
> > >
> > > Having a programmatic API that can be used directly removes all
> > > these requirements, including having /proc mounted.
> > >
> > > As discussed at LPC24, add an ioctl with an extensible struct
> > > so that more parameters can be added later if needed. Start with
> > > returning pid/tgid/ppid and creds unconditionally, and cgroupid
> > > optionally.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@...il.com>
> > > ---
> > > v9: drop result_mask and reuse request_mask instead
> > > v8: use RAII guard for rcu, call put_cred()
> > > v7: fix RCU issue and style issue introduced by v6 found by reviewer
> > > v6: use rcu_read_lock() when fetching cgroupid, use task_ppid_nr_ns() to
> > >     get the ppid, return ESCHR if any of pid/tgid/ppid are 0 at the end
> > >     of the call to avoid providing incomplete data, document what the
> > >     callers should expect
> > > v5: check again that the task hasn't exited immediately before copying
> > >     the result out to userspace, to ensure we are not returning stale data
> > >     add an ifdef around the cgroup structs usage to fix build errors when
> > >     the feature is disabled
> > > v4: fix arg check in pidfd_ioctl() by moving it after the new call
> > > v3: switch from pid_vnr() to task_pid_vnr()
> > > v2: Apply comments from Christian, apart from the one about pid namespaces
> > >     as I need additional hints on how to implement it.
> > >     Drop the security_context string as it is not the appropriate
> > >     metadata to give userspace these days.
> > >
> > >  fs/pidfs.c                                    | 88 ++++++++++++++++++-
> > >  include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h                    | 30 +++++++
> > >  .../testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_open_test.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++-
> > >  3 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c
> > > index 80675b6bf884..15cdc7fe4968 100644
> > > --- a/fs/pidfs.c
> > > +++ b/fs/pidfs.c
> > > @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
> > >  #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
> > >  #include <linux/file.h>
> > >  #include <linux/fs.h>
> > > +#include <linux/cgroup.h>
> > >  #include <linux/magic.h>
> > >  #include <linux/mount.h>
> > >  #include <linux/pid.h>
> > > @@ -114,6 +115,83 @@ static __poll_t pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts)
> > >       return poll_flags;
> > >  }
> > >
> > > +static long pidfd_info(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> > > +{
> > > +     struct pidfd_info __user *uinfo = (struct pidfd_info __user *)arg;
> > > +     size_t usize = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
> > > +     struct pidfd_info kinfo = {};
> > > +     struct user_namespace *user_ns;
> > > +     const struct cred *c;
> > > +     __u64 request_mask;
> > > +
> > > +     if (!uinfo)
> > > +             return -EINVAL;
> > > +     if (usize < sizeof(struct pidfd_info))
> > > +             return -EINVAL; /* First version, no smaller struct possible */
> > > +
> > > +     if (copy_from_user(&request_mask, &uinfo->request_mask, sizeof(request_mask)))
> > > +             return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > +     c = get_task_cred(task);
> > > +     if (!c)
> > > +             return -ESRCH;
> > > +
> > > +     /* Unconditionally return identifiers and credentials, the rest only on request */
> > > +
> > > +     user_ns = current_user_ns();
> > > +     kinfo.ruid = from_kuid_munged(user_ns, c->uid);
> > > +     kinfo.rgid = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, c->gid);
> > > +     kinfo.euid = from_kuid_munged(user_ns, c->euid);
> > > +     kinfo.egid = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, c->egid);
> > > +     kinfo.suid = from_kuid_munged(user_ns, c->suid);
> > > +     kinfo.sgid = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, c->sgid);
> > > +     kinfo.fsuid = from_kuid_munged(user_ns, c->fsuid);
> > > +     kinfo.fsgid = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, c->fsgid);
> > > +     put_cred(c);
> > > +
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
> > > +     if (request_mask & PIDFD_INFO_CGROUPID) {
> > > +             struct cgroup *cgrp;
> > > +
> > > +             guard(rcu)();
> > > +             cgrp = task_cgroup(task, pids_cgrp_id);
> > > +             if (!cgrp)
> > > +                     return -ENODEV;
> >
> > Afaict this means that the task has already exited. In other words, the
> > cgroup id cannot be retrieved anymore for a task that has exited but not
> > been reaped. Frankly, I would have expected the cgroup id to be
> > retrievable until the task has been reaped but that's another
> > discussion.
> >
> > My point is if you contrast this with the other information in here: If
> > the task has exited but hasn't been reaped then you can still get
> > credentials such as *uid/*gid, and pid namespace relative information
> > such as pid/tgid/ppid.
> >
> > So really, I would argue that you don't want to fail this but only
> > report 0 here. That's me working under the assumption that cgroup ids
> > start from 1...
> >
> > /me checks
> >
> > Yes, they start from 1 so 0 is invalid.
> >
> > > +             kinfo.cgroupid = cgroup_id(cgrp);
> >
> > Fwiw, it looks like getting the cgroup id is basically just
> > dereferencing pointers without having to hold any meaningful locks. So
> > it should be fast. So making it unconditional seems fine to me.
> 
> There's an ifdef since it's an optional kernel feature, and there's
> also this thing that we might not have it, so I'd rather keep the
> flag, and set it only if we can get the information (instead of
> failing). As a user that seems clearer to me.

I think we should keep the request_mask flag when returning from the
kernel, but it's not necessary for the user to request it explicitly
because it's cheap to get. This is how STATX_MNT_ID works and I think it
makes sense to do it that way.

(Though there are some complications when we add extensions in the
future -- see my other mail about copy_struct_to_user().)

-- 
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
<https://www.cyphar.com/>

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