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Message-ID: <CAJuCfpFaHz-xW1Rh-+rJ8iLyV19JuG9Rm-eJsz3aOm8dUj3Ewg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 13:55:42 -0700
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>, Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
"James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>, Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
Chris Zankel <chris@...kel.net>, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page mechanism
On Fri, Oct 11, 2024 at 11:12 AM Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 2:51 PM Lorenzo Stoakes
> <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com> wrote:
> > Implement a new lightweight guard page feature, that is regions of userland
> > virtual memory that, when accessed, cause a fatal signal to arise.
> [...]
> > ---
> > arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > arch/xtensa/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 +
> > include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 +
>
> I kinda wonder if we could start moving the parts of those headers
> that are the same for all architectures to include/uapi/linux/mman.h
> instead... but that's maybe out of scope for this series.
>
> [...]
> > diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
> > index e871a72a6c32..7216e10723ae 100644
> > --- a/mm/madvise.c
> > +++ b/mm/madvise.c
> > @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static int madvise_need_mmap_write(int behavior)
> > case MADV_POPULATE_READ:
> > case MADV_POPULATE_WRITE:
> > case MADV_COLLAPSE:
> > + case MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON: /* Only poisoning needs a write lock. */
>
> What does poisoning need a write lock for? anon_vma_prepare() doesn't
> need it (it only needs mmap_lock held for reading),
> zap_page_range_single() doesn't need it, and pagewalk also doesn't
> need it as long as the range being walked is covered by a VMA, which
> it is...
>
> I see you set PGWALK_WRLOCK in guard_poison_walk_ops with a comment
> saying "We might need to install an anon_vma" - is that referring to
> an older version of the patch where the anon_vma_prepare() call was
> inside the pagewalk callback or something like that? Either way,
> anon_vma_prepare() doesn't need write locks (it can't, it has to work
> from the page fault handling path).
I was wondering about that too and I can't find any reason for
write-locking the mm for this operation. PGWALK_WRLOCK should also be
changed to PGWALK_RDLOCK as we are not modifying the VMA.
BTW, I'm testing your patchset on Android and so far it is stable!
>
> > return 0;
> > default:
> > /* be safe, default to 1. list exceptions explicitly */
> [...]
> > +static long madvise_guard_poison(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > + struct vm_area_struct **prev,
> > + unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > + long err;
> > + bool retried = false;
> > +
> > + *prev = vma;
> > + if (!is_valid_guard_vma(vma, /* allow_locked = */false))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Optimistically try to install the guard poison pages first. If any
> > + * non-guard pages are encountered, give up and zap the range before
> > + * trying again.
> > + */
> > + while (true) {
> > + unsigned long num_installed = 0;
> > +
> > + /* Returns < 0 on error, == 0 if success, > 0 if zap needed. */
> > + err = walk_page_range_mm(vma->vm_mm, start, end,
> > + &guard_poison_walk_ops,
> > + &num_installed);
> > + /*
> > + * If we install poison markers, then the range is no longer
> > + * empty from a page table perspective and therefore it's
> > + * appropriate to have an anon_vma.
> > + *
> > + * This ensures that on fork, we copy page tables correctly.
> > + */
> > + if (err >= 0 && num_installed > 0) {
> > + int err_anon = anon_vma_prepare(vma);
>
> I'd move this up, to before we create poison PTEs. There's no harm in
> attaching an anon_vma to the VMA even if the rest of the operation
> fails; and I think it would be weird to have error paths that don't
> attach an anon_vma even though they .
>
> > + if (err_anon)
> > + err = err_anon;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (err <= 0)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + if (!retried)
> > + /*
> > + * OK some of the range have non-guard pages mapped, zap
> > + * them. This leaves existing guard pages in place.
> > + */
> > + zap_page_range_single(vma, start, end - start, NULL);
> > + else
> > + /*
> > + * If we reach here, then there is a racing fault that
> > + * has populated the PTE after we zapped. Give up and
> > + * let the user know to try again.
> > + */
> > + return -EAGAIN;
>
> Hmm, yeah, it would be nice if we could avoid telling userspace to
> loop on -EAGAIN but I guess we don't have any particularly good
> options here? Well, we could bail out with -EINTR if a (fatal?) signal
> is pending and otherwise keep looping... if we'd tell userspace "try
> again on -EAGAIN", we might as well do that in the kernel...
>
> (Personally I would put curly braces around these branches because
> they occupy multiple lines, though the coding style doesn't explicitly
> say that, so I guess maybe it's a matter of personal preference...
> adding curly braces here would match what is done, for example, in
> relocate_vma_down().)
>
> > + retried = true;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int guard_unpoison_pte_entry(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
> > + unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
> > +{
> > + pte_t ptent = ptep_get(pte);
> > +
> > + if (is_guard_pte_marker(ptent)) {
> > + /* Simply clear the PTE marker. */
> > + pte_clear_not_present_full(walk->mm, addr, pte, true);
>
> I think that last parameter probably should be "false"? The sparc code
> calls it "fullmm", which is a term the MM code uses when talking about
> operations that remove all mappings in the entire mm_struct because
> the process has died, which allows using some faster special-case
> version of TLB shootdown or something along those lines.
>
> > + update_mmu_cache(walk->vma, addr, pte);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct mm_walk_ops guard_unpoison_walk_ops = {
> > + .pte_entry = guard_unpoison_pte_entry,
> > + .walk_lock = PGWALK_RDLOCK,
> > +};
>
> It is a _little_ weird that unpoisoning creates page tables when they
> don't already exist, which will also prevent creating THP entries on
> fault in such areas afterwards... but I guess it doesn't really matter
> given that poisoning has that effect, too, and you probably usually
> won't call MADV_GUARD_UNPOISON on an area that hasn't been poisoned
> before... so I guess this is not an actionable comment.
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